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INTRODUCTION  
 
An initial public offering (IPO) is the process through which an unlisted company (a privately 
held company) sells for the first time its shares to the public and becomes listed on a stock 
exchange. It is one of the most important events in the life of a company: as stated by Zingales 
(1995), the IPO is generally the largest equity issue that a company ever makes. An initial public 
offering allows firms to raise new equity capital necessary to finance their growth plans and 
permits pre-IPO owners to monetize part of their investments in the firm, using the offering as 
an exit strategy. Going public also guarantees significant intangible benefits to the companies: 
better reputation, increased visibility and higher prestige that can provide marketing and 
commercial advantages, strengthen the relationships with costumers and suppliers, and 
facilitate the recruitment of more qualified manager and employees. Nevertheless, the process 
of going public is complex and time-consuming; the transition from private to publicly traded 
company is not easy and generates several changes: the transformation of the firm’s ownership 
structure, a loss of management control, an increase in the disclosure requirements and in 
regulatory oversights. IPO requires a long preparation and its success strictly depends on the 
planning of the whole process and on the decisions taken by the issuing firm and by the 
underwriter. 
The existence of IPO underpricing phenomenon has been well-documented by literature. IPOs 
are underpriced when shares are offered to investors at prices that are below the prices at which 
shares trade on the stock exchange the first day of listing. Underpricing is considered an 
opportunity costs for firms going public since issuers selling shares at an offer price lower than 
their potential market value, are “leaving money on the table”. The first to analyse this 
phenomenon related to initial public offerings were Reilly (1973) and Ibbotson (1975); in the 
last forty years, IPO underpricing has been discussed in several scientific papers and different 
theories have been developed to understand and explain its causes. Most studies have described 
and analysed underpricing in the US stock market, but, although the level of underpricing varies 
from country to country and from sector to sector, the presence of this phenomenon has been 
confirmed also in every other studied market. Ritter and Welch (2002) showed that US IPOs 
conducted in the period from 1980 to 2001 had an average first-day return of 18.8%; while 
Loughran and Ritter (2004) demonstrated that the level of underpricing is cyclical: they found 
that the average first day return was 7% in the 1980s, 15% in the years 1990-1998, 65% during 
the “Dot-com bubble” (1999-2000) and 12% in the period 2001-2003. Additionally, Jenkinson 
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and Ljungqvist (2001) concluded that the IPO first day return is approximately 15% in 
industrialized countries and, on average, 60% in emerging markets.  
It is not possible to identify a single theory able to provide an exhaustive explanation of this 
phenomenon; past researches have offered different models that study IPO underpricing and 
that examine the factors influencing the level of first day return. The most important theories 
are focused on asymmetric information between issuing firms, underwriters and investors. The 
best-known model that studies information asymmetries between investors is Rock’s (1986) 
“winner’s curse”. Investors can be classified into “informed” and “uninformed” and, according 
to Rock, issuing firms need to underprice their shares to attract uninformed investors to 
participate in the IPO, because underpricing ensures them a reasonable return for their ex-ante 
uncertainty. Indeed, ex-ante uncertainty about the value of the firm is related with the degree 
of underpricing and, as shown by Beatty and Ritter (1986), the greater the ex-ante uncertainty, 
the greater the expected underpricing. Baron (1982), instead, analysed information asymmetries 
between issuing firms and underwriters; Baron’s model assumes that investment banks have 
superior information and that issuing firms rationally allow underwriters to underprice, to 
compensate them for the use of their superior information about the demand level for the shares 
offered in the IPO.  
According to “Information Revelation theories”, institutional investors have superior 
information than the issuer and the investment banks: Benveniste and Spindt (1989) introduced 
“information gathering theories” and showed that book-building is an appropriate mechanism 
to reduce uncertainty and information asymmetries and that issuing firms deliberately 
underprice because, in the absence of underpricing, investors would not have interests in 
revealing their private positive information. Cornelli and Goldreich’s (1999) and Hanley’s 
(1993) findings supported “information gathering theory”; they demonstrated that underwriters 
allocate large fractions of shares to investors that reveal information and that new positive 
information collected is only partially incorporated in the final offer price. Instead, “Signaling 
theory” assumes that companies have better information about firms’ prospects and value than 
investors. Signaling theory was introduced by Spence (1973) and Ibbotson (1975) and then 
developed by Allen and Faulhaber (1989), Grinblatt and Hwang (1989) and Welch (1989). They 
all concluded that underpricing is used by good quality firms to signal their value and convince 
potential subscribers of their high quality: this is a credible signal because only high-quality 
firms can recoup the initial loss associated with IPO underpricing.  
Other different categories of theories built to explain the underpricing phenomenon are the 
following: “Ownership Dispersion theories” were developed by Zingales (1995), Booth and 
6 
Chua (1996), Brennan and Franks (1997) and investigate the relation between ownership’s 
structure changes and IPO underpricing; “Lawsuit Avoidance theories” were introduced by 
Logue (1973) and Ibbotson (1975) and supported by Tinic (1988), Hughes and Takhor (1992), 
Lowry and Shu (2002) and state that IPO underpricing is used as a mean of insurance against 
legal liability and reputation damage, and that litigation risks induce firms and investment banks 
to underprice; finally, “Behavioural theories” were built by Welch (1992) and Ritter (1998) and 
assert that underpricing is the result of investors’ behavioural biases. In addition to the theories 
regarding the reasons why companies leave money on the table, there are also other studies that 
analyses the main variables that affect the level of first day return: Beatty and Ritter (1986) 
examined the relation between the degree of underpricing and the ex-ante uncertainty about 
company’s value, Logue (1973) and Titman and Trueman (1986) studied the relation between 
underpricing and the reputation of the underwriter, while Sindelar, Ritter and Ibbotson (1994) 
analysed the IPO market cycles and their impact on the level of underpricing.  
Some of the most important and largest IPOs occurred in recent years are internet-related IPOs. 
Among the most important and relevant IPOs of the last 15 years, the following are internet-
IPOs: Google IPO (2004), Facebook IPO (2012), Alibaba IPO (2014), Twitter IPO (2013), 
Groupon (2013), Snapchat (2017). In this thesis, I decided to analyse IPOs in the internet sector, 
since the available literature on internet-related IPOs is mainly focused on the period of the 
Internet Bubble (1999-2001) and on the comparison between internet and non-internet IPOs. 
Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2002) studied the causes of the extremely high first day returns 
reached during “Dot-com bubble” by internet IPOs and all IPOs in general; Ritter and Welch 
(2002) examined the increase in the percentage of tech and internet IPOs over time, while 
Loughran and Ritter (2004) demonstrated that the increase in the average level of underpricing 
is also related to the increase in the portion of IPOs conducted by young tech and internet 
companies. Finally, Lowry and Schwert (2002) and several other authors showed that, on 
average, technology and internet IPOs are more underpriced than non-technology and non-
internet IPOs.  
The aim of this thesis is not to compare the performance of IPOs in different economic sectors 
and observe how internet-related IPOs perform with respect to other IPOs. The research 
objective is, instead, to study only IPOs in the internet sector and find out which are the most 
important internet firms’ characteristics and factors which influence their IPO initial returns. I 
focused my research on US internet IPOs conducted in the period from 2000 to 2013 and listed 
on NASDAQ and on NYSE; I used several variables (which include IPO first-day return, age 
of issuing companies, firms’ market capitalization, ratio of shares offered in the IPO, 
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underwriter reputation and period of the IPO) to describe the principal characteristics of IPOs 
in the sample and to highlight the potential relationships between the level of IPO initial returns 
and the variables analysed. Then, I decided to examine the Facebook IPO case because, after 
having analysed almost the whole population of internet-IPOs conducted in the years 2000-
2013, Facebook’s IPO seemed to be an outlier IPO: it was the largest, most anticipated and 
hyped internet IPO of that period and, contrary to expectations, was not characterized by high 
initial return but by poor stock performance for at least the first three months after the listing. I 
tried to study all the different causes and reasons of Facebook’s IPO failure because, only 
considering the specific problems and the unique characteristics of Facebook’s IPO, it is 
possible to explain its negative stock market debut. 
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 1 provides an overview of IPOs, 
describing the main steps involved in the IPO process, the different pricing mechanisms and 
the services provided by underwriters; it also summarizes the advantages of going public and 
all the costs that issuing firms must incur.  
Chapter 2 presents the literature review of underpricing phenomenon and reports which are, 
according to past empirical researches, the variables that affect the level of IPO underpricing. 
In the last paragraph, it is also briefly described the long-run underperformance of initial public 
offerings.  
Chapter 3 shows the empirical research performed on internet IPOs. After having described the 
data used, the data sources and the most important variables studied, the chapter presents all the 
descriptive statistics analysed, the most relevant results obtained in the research in comparison 
with literature findings and the differences between Facebook’s IPO and the other internet IPOs. 
Chapter 4 reports the Facebook’ IPO case: it is analysed the business and the economic 
performance of the company before the IPO, it is described the IPO process and the problems 
arisen the last days before the offering, and it is performed a valuation of the company using 
DCF methodology. In the final part of the chapter, it is discussed the causes of Facebook’s IPO 
failure and the reasons behind the bad stock performance. 
The final chapter, Chapter 5, presents the main results of the thesis and the limitations of the 
analysis performed.  
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CHAPTER 1 - HOW TO GO PUBLIC 
 
1.1 - WHAT IS AN IPO? 
“Few events in the life of a company are as great in magnitude and consequence as initial public 
offering (IPO)” (Draho, 2004, p.1). An initial public offering is the first time that stocks issued 
by a company are sold to public investors. So, companies go public via an IPO and their shares 
become quoted on a stock exchange. “The initial public offering (IPO) is frequently the largest 
equity issue a corporation ever makes” (Zingales, 1995, p. 425). 
The process of going public is a milestone for private company but it is complex, complicated 
and time-consuming. It involves different specific steps and requires important decisions to be 
made. Firms need to accurately take into consideration not only the trade-off between the 
advantages and disadvantages of going public, but also the implications of this decision and the 
problems that will arise. The decision to go public, in fact, generates substantial changes in the 
everyday life of a company: there is a change in the firm’s ownership structure, a loss of 
management control, an increase in information disclosure requirements and an increase in 
regulatory oversight. Other important issues that need to be analysed before starting the IPO 
process are: the check of substantial, formal and listing requirements, the choice of the stock 
market, the path leading to the listing and the relationship with investors. The success of the 
IPO strictly depends on the decisions taken, on the planning of the whole process and on the 
management of the relations with the market. 
 
1.2 - WHY DO PRIVATE COMPANY DECIDE TO GO PUBLIC? 
Which are the benefits of going public? There is not a unique answer to this question; there are 
different and various beneficial reasons. Going public allows firms to raise new equity capital 
necessary to finance the growth of the company. As stated by Dessy and Vender (2001), stock 
market is one of the most important financing channels for firms: it permits firms to pursue 
their development plans without creating any further debt. The funds received from the stocks 
sold in an IPO provide huge amount of liquidity (e.g. in 2014, Alibaba was able to raise $25bn 
in its IPO, which is today considered the world’s biggest IPO in history) that can be used to 
balance the company’s financial structure, to support the rapid expansion of firm’s operations, 
to enhance research and development activities or to finance the acquisition of other companies 
for external growth purpose. Public companies have also easier access to debt markets thanks 
to the transparency of their financial and economic situation with respect to private firms. 
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Another important motivation to go public is the fact that the stock exchange listing permits 
firm’s founders and pre-IPO investors to monetize part of their investments in open-market 
transactions or to totally liquidate their position using the listing as an exit strategy. Zingales 
(1995, p.425) affirmed that “the IPO is also an important channel through which an entrepreneur 
or venture capitalist gets rewarded for his initial effort”. 
Going public guarantees significant intangible benefits: public companies obtain an increased 
visibility with respect to private companies through their ongoing information disclosures to 
the stock market. In addition, as sustained by Geddes (2003), listed companies can attract and 
recruit more qualified manager and higher quality employees thanks to the visibility and 
prestige that often characterize this kind of companies. There are also marketing and 
commercial advantages: a firm become better known during the IPO process and, generally, a 
listed firm is considered stronger and more stable. The better reputation, that companies can 
gain for being listed, can facilitate and encourage relationships with suppliers and customers. 
Public firms have the possibility to use their stocks as a payment method in the acquisition of 
other business reducing, in this way, cash needs of the acquiring firms. Taulli (2000) said that 
using stocks as consideration is a common practice for mergers and acquisitions. Moreover, 
listed companies have the possibility to compensate and motivate their manager using stock 
options. 
Another benefit of being a listed company can be linked to the existence of the daily market 
valuation determined by investors and expressed by means of stock prices. Stock prices daily 
change to reflect and value management choices and company’s results; Dessy and Vender 
(2001) affirmed that this kind of valuation can be considered a good benchmark for the firm’s 
real value (at least in the medium-term). 
 
1.3 - THE IPO PROCESS 
Going public is a complex and time-consuming process. Draho (2004, p.182) showed that 
“internal preparations for the IPO can begin up to two years prior to the offer date”. A company 
must choose the stock exchange for the listing of its shares, select the underwriter (the 
investment bank) and the auditor, decide the type of the offering: preparation activities and 
these decisions are fundamental to the success of the IPO. Once the process is started, a 
company must work closely with the investment bank, produce the information required by 
regulatory authorities, run the marketing phase, undertake road shows, manage the relationship 
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with the market. The various steps involved in an IPO are described and analysed in the 
following paragraphs. 
 
The Choice of the Stock Market 
Before issuing shares to the public, a company must choose which stock exchange to list its 
shares on. Firms going public often choose their domestic stock exchange but, in recent years, 
as described by Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001), with the increasing irrelevance of national 
boundaries, thanks to the spread of electronic trading, and the increasing competition between 
stock exchanges, companies have become more and more free to choose where to have their 
shares listed. 
In the US, the major markets are: the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the NASDAQ Stock 
Market and the American Stock Exchange (AMEX). The London Stock Exchange 
comprehends: the Official List (the main market), the Alternative Investment Market (AIM, the 
market for small and growing companies) and techMARK (the market designed for high-
technology firms). In Italy, stock market is divided between: the main list on Mercato 
Telematico Azionario (MTA), the STAR segment (“Segmento per Titoli ad Alti Requisiti”) and 
the segment for small, innovative and high growth firms (“Nuovo Mercato”). 
Each market has different and specific listing requirements. For example, the NYSE has more 
stringent requirements and standards with respect to the NASDAQ (in terms of offering size, 
firm’s total assets, revenue and profitability); while in UK, companies listed in the AIM 
segment or techMARK are subject to less regulation than the ones listed on the Official List. 
Firms going public must respect and satisfy the listing requirements and the regulations 
imposed by the market in which they seek the admission. After verifying the compliance with 
the requirements, companies must submit an application to the stock exchange. Generally, as 
described in detail by Bagley and Dauchy (2012), the application is made the same day or 
shortly thereafter the registration statement1 is filed. 
The choice of the stock market not only depends on the specific financial requirements and on 
the minimum listing standards imposed by the regulatory body of each stock exchange. Indeed, 
it is also important to consider the costs associated with the listing and, above all, the effects 
that the different market can have on the image and visibility of the firm. The market’s 
reputation can have a relevant influence on the final choice. The most prestigious market is the 
                                                          
1
 The “registration statement” is discussed in the next paragraphs (See “The Drafting of the Prospectus”). 
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New York Stock Exchange: the listing on NYSE can guarantee the firm immediate visibility 
between investors. Nevertheless, Taulli (2000) argued that the NASDAQ is today the market 
preferred by the most important high-tech companies in the world. 
 
The Selection of the Underwriter 
“The investment bank is a vital cog in a successful IPO. […] Consequently, the 
issuer/underwriter relationship is of paramount importance and must be structured wisely.” 
(Draho, 2004, p.187). Generally, the management of a private company has never started an 
IPO process before and so lacks detailed knowledge of the stock market. Investment banks can 
then offer the possibility to exploit their experience in the stock exchange listing, their network 
of knowledge between investors (above all institutional investors), their reputation on the 
market and their competencies, in order to increase the firm’s visibility and help in making the 
necessary changes that a company going public must fulfil. 
Initial public offerings are managed and controlled by investment banks that provide different 
services: first of all, banks have to perform a “due diligence” investigation in which they analyse 
the financial situations of the company and verify that capital requirements are satisfied, then 
they have to collaborate with the company to prepare and drawn up the prospectus, in addition 
they have to underwrite the stock offering assuming part of the risk associated with the issue 
proceeds and, finally, they have to sell the shares to the public and allocate them to investors. 
Investment banks play also a relevant role in determining the pricing of the shares and the 
timing of the listing, and in supporting the marketing phase of the IPO.  
Before analysing the services provided by the investment bank, it is helpful to examine how the 
process of selecting an underwriter is articulated. In the underwriting market for IPOs there are 
several investment banks that are ranked using total IPO proceeds and market share. The most 
important are Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Citigroup, UBS, Merrill Lynch.2 Firms start 
the selection with a “beauty contest” (or “bake-off”) in which each participating bank makes a 
formal presentation to the board of directors. According to Bagley and Dauchy (2012), banks 
in their presentation emphasize their expertise in the IPO process and their reputation, and show 
their recent relevant IPOs, the post-IPO price performance of the companies they have taken 
public and their preliminary views on the market value of the company. After the “beauty 
contest”, the firm chooses the investment bank that will be the lead manager of the IPO process 
(a company can also select two or more banks that will act as co-lead managers). To evaluate 
                                                          
2
 Source: Dealogic. 
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the potential lead managers, a company can use different combined criteria: cost minimization 
(the choice of underwriter influences the IPO costs, in particular underpricing and 
compensation costs), bank’s reputation and, moreover, the reputation of bank’s analysts who 
will follow the listing, information specialization (the quality of information that the bank has 
collected about the firm and potential investors) and monitoring services (the level of external 
underwriter monitoring). 
The “Underwriting Agreement” is a formal contract that acts as a purchasing contract between 
the issuer and the underwriter. There are three principal forms of the contract: “firm 
commitment”, “best efforts” and “all-or-none”. In the firm commitment contract, the 
underwriter guarantees to purchase all the shares issued and to absorb the eventual loss 
generated by unsold shares; in the best effort contract, instead, the underwriter makes an effort 
to sell firm’s stocks but does not guarantee the proceeds and unsold shares return to the issuer. 
In an all-or-none underwriting, if the entire issue is not sold, then the issue is cancelled, and 
investors’ money collected will be returned.  
Another aspect to take into consideration in the relationship between the issuer and the 
underwriter is the underwriter compensation. The primary form of compensation is represented 
by the spread: the difference, expressed as a percentage, between net price (the price at which 
the underwriter buys shares from the issuer) and offer price (the price at which the underwriter 
sells the shares to the public); in other words, it is the percentage of the offer price retained by 
the investment bank. The spread comprehends management fee, underwriting fee and selling 
concession. In recent years, a 7 percent spread is the most common spread charged by 
underwriters (for very large IPOs, lower spreads are charged). Chen and Ritter (2000), in their 
paper entitled “The Seven Percent Solution”, showed that, in the period between 1995 and 1998, 
more than 90 percent of US IPOs raising between $20 million and $80 million had spreads of 
exactly 7 percent. High spreads represent a relevant cost for a firm going public but the 
convergence to a common spread eliminates, totally or in part, compensation cost as an 
underwriter selection criterion. In some cases, especially in best efforts agreement, investment 
banks receive an additional compensation in the form of warrants. A warrant grants the 
underwriter the right to buy firm’s shares at a fixed price (exercise price) that is lower than the 
offer price. 
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The Due Diligence Process 
At the beginning of the issuer-underwriter relationship, there is an initial information-gathering 
phase. The bank chosen as the lead manager performs the due diligence investigation which 
includes: financial, business, legal and accounting due diligence. In this phase, the underwriter 
works closely with the firm; generally, due diligence consists of company inspections and 
meetings, interviews, question-and-answer sessions with senior and operational managers of 
the firm. Due diligence is needed to ensure that all necessary and relevant information about 
the company is accurate and complete. As stated by Espinasse (2014), an appropriate due 
diligence investigation is fundamental for any due diligence defence against prospectus 
liability. 
In the business due diligence, the underwriter examines the company’s activities and business 
operations; in the financial due diligence, instead, it analyses firm’s capital structure, business 
plan and financial forecasts. In addition, in the legal and accounting due diligence, the 
underwriter inspects contracts (for example, contracts with main customers and suppliers), legal 
documents and accounts ledgers. Finally, the underwriter also verifies managers’ qualifications 
and experience to run the firm. 
 
 
Figure 1 - Key steps of the IPO process. Source: IANNOTTA, G., 2010.  
Investment banking. A guide to Underwriting and Advisory Services (p.53). Heidelberg [u.a]: Springer. 
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The Drafting of the Prospectus 
As it is possible to observe in Figure 1, the preparation of the prospectus is performed in parallel 
to the due diligence investigation. All the information gathered in the due diligence phase is 
used to draft an initial (or preliminary) prospectus that, in the US, is also known as “red herring” 
prospectus because it has a legal disclaimer printed in red in the front page. In fact, the 
information contained in this preliminary document are usually not complete and subject to 
change. 
“The prospectus is, legally, the only publication that investors should use in order to make an 
investment decision to buy shares […] in an IPO” (Espinasse, 2014, p.102) and, so, the initial 
prospectus is the primary source of information accessible to all investors. It contains 
information regarding the issuer, the firm’s business and strategy, the company’s competitive 
advantage and potential risk factors, the quality of the management, the use of proceeds and, 
also, information about principal shareholders and the investment bank chosen as underwriter. 
The prospectus “is a key marketing and protection tool for retail investors” (Iannotta, 2010, 
p.53). The “offering circular” is, instead, used to indicate a different version of the prospectus 
that contains all the information necessary for institutional investors. 
The final prospectus includes also detailed information about the issue, with the specification 
of the final price and the number of shares offered. The document must be approved by the 
market authority (e.g., in the US, by the SEC, “Securities and Exchange Commission”); the 
investment bank and the issuer are liable for its content.  
In the US, the final prospectus is the most important document in the registration statement, 
which is filed with the SEC for the registration of initial public offerings. The registration 
statement must conform to SEC rules which specifies both the amount and the format of 
information required. Companies, in general, submit the registration statement on Form S-1 
which is composed by: (a) the prospectus3; (b) all supplemental information (e.g., the 
company’s charter and bylaw, the underwriting agreement…). Form S-1 requires several 
documents and detailed data; for this reason, small issuers can use Form SB-1 and Form SB-2 
(that require less specific information and a less complex procedure than Form S-1) to register 
their offerings. Once received the registration statement, the SEC’s Division of Corporate 
Finance must verify its accuracy and conformance to disclosure requirements and it can always 
refuse to render the registration statement effective if information is incomplete or some 
documents are missing. After the approval of the prospectus and all the other documents, the 
                                                          
3
 In Italy, it is called “Prospetto Informativo” and it must be filed with the CONSOB. 
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registration statement becomes effective and the final prospectus becomes available to 
investors. A company is not allowed to sell its shares until the registration filed with the SEC 
is effective. 
 
Marketing Phase 
The IPO marketing phase starts with important pre-marketing activities, which are also known 
as pre-deal investor education (PDIE). The investment bank’s analysts prepare a Pre-IPO 
Research Report about the company, which is used to educate institutional investors on the 
firm’s investment case. The Research Report contains the analysts’ valuation and company’s 
financial projections. Pre-deal investor education is important because it permits to collect 
investors’ feedbacks and their interest in participating in the IPO, so as to help the underwriter 
in determining a price range for the issue. 
In the last couple of weeks (in general 2 or 3 weeks) prior to the listing, companies undertake 
the “roadshow”. Roadshows are a series of short meetings in which the management of the 
issuing company and the investment bank present the issue to potential investors (both retail 
and institutional investors). Meetings can take place in different financial centre (including the 
city in which the stocks will be listed); they can include presentations to a large audience and 
“one-on-one session” with the most important investors. Roadshows presentations do not add 
new information about the firm and “merely reiterate fairly general information already 
contained in the prospectus. Perhaps surprisingly, road shows may instead be a way for the 
investment banker to gather information from investors, about their views of the company and 
its valuation. […] The marketing phase thus generates a lot of additional information regarding 
the reaction of the potential investors to the offer, which can be fed into the next stage of the 
process when the final price is set” (Jenkinson and Ljungqvist, 2001, pp.14-15). These meetings 
are, indeed, “a key tool in testing the market appetite for the IPO” (Yates and Hinchliffe, 2010, 
p.383): in this phase, investors are solicited to make non-binding bids4 and it is created a book 
of orders useful to determine the final price of the issue (the Book-building process5). 
In addition to the roadshow, there are also other forms of marketing for an IPO, like press 
briefings and advertising. Marketing campaign is critical and, as stated by Kuhn (1990, p.269), 
                                                          
4
 “In some cases the bids received during the marketing stage are legally binding (for example those from retail 
investors), but in the case of institutional investors the bids are more normally not. However, in practice, even 
though such institutional bids may not be legally binding, there is a strong presumption that investors should be 
prepared to honour their bids”. (Jenkinson and Ljungqvist, 2001, p.14) 
5
 See next paragraph “IPO Pricing (Book-Building Mechanism, Fixed-price Offerings and Auctions)” 
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it “will determine the success or failure of the IPO. The key is to stimulate investor demand for 
the stock so that, as in basic economics, the demand will exceed the supply.”  
According to Cook, Kieschnick and Van Ness (2006), who analysed a sample of US IPOs from 
1993 to 2000, marketing is also critical for the aftermarket performance of the IPO; in their 
paper entitled “On the marketing of IPOs” (2006, p.59), they reported that there is “a positive 
and significant correlation between retail trading activity during the first day of trading in an 
IPO and the IPO’s pre-issue publicity, […], pre-issue publicity is positively correlated with 
upward revisions in IPO offer prices and offer price valuations that are above comparable firms 
in their industry, […], insider wealth exceed their dilution losses when more pre-issue publicity 
is associated with their IPO, […], initial IPO returns are positively correlated with pre-issue 
publicity, and […], investment banker compensation is positively and significantly correlated 
with pre-issue publicity.” 
  
IPO Pricing (Book-Building Mechanism, Fixed-price Offerings and Auctions) 
The final steps of the IPO process involve the pricing and the allocation of firm’s shares. As 
sustained by Espinasse (2014, p.193): “pricing and allocating an IPO is really more of an art 
than a science. It needs to take into account the priorities of the issuer, of the selling shareholders 
(if any) and of the investors so as to encourage aftermarket buying and a steady increase in the 
share price”.  
According to Sindelar, Ritter and Ibbotson (1994), the pricing of IPOs is a difficult process 
because it is not possible to observe market price prior to the offering and also because issuing 
firms are, generally, young companies with little operating history. The offer price must reflect 
the fundamental value of the company and must be aligned with the valuation of comparable 
firms (“peer comparison”). At the same time, it must also take into consideration issuer’s and 
underwriter’s interests, investors’ feedbacks and financial market conjuncture. Sindelar, Ritter 
and Ibbotson (1994, p.66) stated that “if the price is set too low, the issuer does not get the full 
advantage of its ability to raise capital. If it is priced too high, then the investor would get an 
inferior return and consequently might reject the offering”. 
There are three different IPO pricing mechanisms: book-building, fixed-price offering and 
auction. Nowadays, the most popular mechanism worldwide is book-building. The use of book-
building has been growing rapidly over the last two decades and its growing popularity has 
come, above all, at the expense of auctions. Draho (2004, p.219) asserted that “issuers, 
underwriters and institutional investors appear to universally favour book-building when given 
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the choice”, but he added that “by and large, issuers do not get to choose their IPO mechanism. 
Either regulatory constraints limit the choice or market forces dictate that certain types of 
issuers must use a particular method”. 
In fixed-price mechanism, the issue’s final price is already specified in the preliminary 
prospectus and is chosen prior to collecting orders from investors; so, it is not influenced by 
market’s demand and cannot be adjusted in response to excess supply or demand. Normally, 
fixed-price offerings are used when the underwriting agreement is a best-effort contract; the 
underwriter does not actively sell the shares but it only distributes the prospectus, collects orders 
and performs share allocation6 with limited discretion. 
The book-building mechanism is, instead, typical of firm commitment contract and it is 
characterized by more discretion permitted to the underwriter and to the issuer in pricing and 
allocating the shares. It can be divided in three main steps. In the first one, the underwriter, after 
having distributed the preliminary prospectus which contains a preliminary share price range, 
determines which investors are invited to participate in the book-building process. In general, 
investment banks consider only institutional investors in this process and exclude retail ones7. 
Retail investors are not invited, as discussed by Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001, p.17) given 
“the infeasibility of inviting and discussing the issue with a large number of small investors”, 
and because they “may typically be less informed as to the value of the company than 
professional investors”. In the second step, investors communicate their interest and submit 
their bids. Bids can be strike bid (in which the investor accepts to buy a given number of share 
at whatever price is set within the preliminary range) or limit bids (in which the investor divides 
its bid in different price-quantity combination and communicates a price above which he does 
not consider the purchase). This step is usually performed during the road show and it is a 
dynamic process, “with the investors and investment bank both getting a feel for the state of 
demand and with investors revising their bids as the process evolves” (Jenkinson and 
Ljungqvist, 2001, p.17). Indeed, if during the book-building process it results that the demand 
is very strong (or very weak), underwriters can revise the range of the offer price and investors 
can submit new bids. In the final step, the investment bank determines the final price and 
allocates shares. Despite knowing investors’ demand curve, the final price is not determined 
only by matching demand and supply, but the investment bank maintains a significant discretion 
in setting the price and allocating the shares.  
                                                          
6
 See next paragraph “Allocation of the Shares” 
7
 “The book-building method is often criticized because, in contrast to the other methods, underwriters generally 
exclude investors from the bidding process”. (Sherman and Titman, 2002, p.1) 
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The last alternative mechanism that underwriter and issuing firm have, to price the issue, is 
auction; even if, in practice, they can also use hybrid offerings mechanisms which combine 
book-building and fixed price or book-building and auction. “Auctions afford the issuer and 
underwriter the least amount of control in determining the IPO outcome” (Draho, 2004, p.218). 
Investors specify the limit price of their offer and the number of shares they are willing to buy. 
The aggregate demand curve is formed by all the individual orders and the final price is 
determined by the matching of demand and fixed supply. All investors who bid a price above 
the offer price receive firm’s shares. There are two main auction models: single-price auctions 
(in which all investors pay the same price) and discriminatory-price auctions (in which investors 
pay what they bid). Unlike book-building, auction can “be conducted as entirely 
disintermediated processes” (Jenkinson and Ljungqvist, 2001, p.19).  
 
Allocation of the Shares   
Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2002) showed that IPO allocation policies generally favour 
institutional investors. In their paper entitled “IPO allocations: discriminatory or 
discretionary?”, after having analysed 1.032 IPOs between 1990 and 2000 across 37 different 
countries, they concluded that share allocated to institutional investors are almost double than 
those received by retail ones. They demonstrated that this happens both in US, where 
underwriters have full discretion in most IPOs, and outside US, where investment banks’ 
allocation discretion is more constrained. 
In general, there is no pricing and allocation discretion provided by auction mechanism. Once 
decided the model of the auction, the underwriter has a passive role. “The bids are effectively 
anonymous, as shares are allocated in a non-discriminatory basis to institutional and retail 
investors” (Draho, 2004, p.218).  
In fixed-price offerings, several allocation mechanisms reflecting the market’s regulations are 
used in different countries. The most common is “fair allocation system”, in which share 
allocation is performed pro rata when the issue is oversubscribed. Many countries allow some 
kind of discrimination based on order size or in favour of particular types of investor, but, 
generally, “fixed-price offerings provide underwriters with no discretion because shares are 
simply allocated on a pro rata basis” (Ljungqvist and Wilhelm, 2002, p.16). 
As described by Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001, pp.18-19), “the sorts of non-discriminatory 
rules that often apply to fixed price offerings do not apply to book-building efforts: the 
investment bank, in consultation with the issuing company, will have complete discretion over 
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who is allocated shares. This discretion over allocation is one of the controversial aspects of 
book-building, in part because not all investors are able to take part in the book-building in the 
first place”. Allocation discretion is used to reward investors that reveal positive information 
during book-building process and, as stated by Iannotta (2010), the empirical evidence confirms 
the fact that more informed investors receive larger allocations. Investment bank’s discretion 
induces investors to reveal their information before the final pricing of the IPO and the reward 
for investors providing information is underpricing. In general, “the institutional allocation 
increases with the amount of underpricing because the two are jointly determined by the 
positive information revealed by the institutions” (Draho, 2004, pp.222-223). 
 
Listing and Trading 
Once the IPO pricing and allocation have been performed, secondary market trading starts 
shortly after (usually after a couple of days). Generally, the first days are characterized by 
volatility and a trading volume extraordinary high as some investors continue to buy shares and 
others flip8 their allocations to obtain a short-term profit. The underwriter plays an important 
role in stabilizing the price of the shares. Price stabilization activity is aimed at absorbing the 
excess supply of shares and avoid excessive price fall in order to protect investors against 
downside risk in the first trading period. The investment bank starts “to buy shares in the after-
market in the event of pressure for the share price to fall (in particular below the issue price) 
and to sell more shares (either at the time of the IPO or in the after-market) in the event of high 
levels of excess demand for the shares” (Jenkinson and Ljungqvist, 2001, p.21). Stabilization 
activities last usually for two weeks after the first day of listing and the possibility to perform 
price stabilization must be disclosed in the IPO final prospectus.  
The underwriter can also provide analyst coverage of the company after its IPO and help to 
develop an effective communication program, with which it is possible to ensure a steady flow 
of information to new investors. All the services provided by the underwriter are essential to 
ensure the company’s smooth transition from private to public ownership. 
 
 
                                                          
8
 “Investors who receive an IPO allocation are said to flip their shares if they sell them immediately in the 
aftermarket. Flipping could be motivated by the desire to lock in quick profits or to dump shares before price 
stabilization ends”. (Draho, 2004, p.263) 
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1.4 - THE COST OF AN IPO 
Undertaking an IPO is a time-consuming and costly process. Companies must consider not only 
the costs associated with the IPO process (the costs of listing) but also the ongoing costs of 
being a public company (the costs of maintaining a public company structure). According to 
Dessy and Vender (2001), rather than costs, it would be more appropriate to talk about 
“investments” needed to go public, as the decision of becoming a public company brings several 
benefits that help the firm to create value in the long-term. 
All the key decisions made by the issuer during the IPO process affect the direct and indirect 
costs of going public. The most important decisions influencing the price are: the choice of the 
underwriter, the proportion of equity sold to new investors, the amount of money to raise, the 
price of the issue, the pricing and allocation mechanism. In addition, as shown by Menyah and 
Paudyal (2002), the costs depend also, on firm characteristics and market conditions: firm size 
(market capitalisation), pre-IPO ownership of the company, the book to market ratio and the 
market volatility at the time of the IPO. 
The most relevant cost of the IPO is the underwriter’s compensation: the gross spread that is 
expressed as a percentage of total IPO proceeds. In US, medium-size IPOs tend to have a gross 
spread equal to 7% while, in Europe, this percentage is generally lower. Gross spread 
comprehends management fee, selling fee and underwriting fee, which are negotiated between 
the issuer and the investment bank and, generally, revealed in the prospectus.  
Marketing campaign and road show expenses, legal and accounting fees, printing expenses for 
the prospectus and registration (or listing) fees are the main fixed costs. According to Heim 
(2002, p.28), “attorneys’ fees, accounting fees and other expenses can easily add up to $400,000 
to $500,000 for a typical IPO”. Moreover, it must be also considered the opportunity cost of 
management time: the time that senior managers spend working with investment bank’s 
analysts in preparing the prospectus and other documents for the IPO. “Each hour that the 
management and employees of a company spend in providing information to the lawyers and 
investment bankers is an hour that is lost in running the operations of the company” (Heim, 
2002, p.29). 
The pricing mechanism influences also the cost of an IPO. In general, pricing the IPO using 
book-building process is more costly than using fixed-price or auction mechanism. After having 
studied a sample of 2,143 IPOs by issuers from 65 countries during the period from 1992 to 
1999, Ljungqvist, Jenkinson and Wilhelm (2003, p.2), found that “the direct costs of 
bookbuilding are, in our sample, around twice as high as in fixed-price offerings”. 
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Regarding the ongoing costs of being public, the company has to incur expenses linked with 
reporting requirements (quarterly and annual reports), mandatory stockholder meetings and 
investor relations. Being public entails also incremental staff and board costs, professional fees 
for accounting advice, audit, legal and annual listing fees. These are all substantial and ongoing 
expenses that a company must consider before undertaking an initial public offering. 
Finally, also the underpricing is generally considered an indirect cost of an IPO. It is defined as 
the percentage difference between the offer price and the first day closing price. It is an 
opportunity cost since issuers, selling shares at a price below their potential market value, are 
“leaving money on the table”.9
                                                          
9
 Underpricing Phenomenon is discussed and analysed in Chapter 2 - “IPO UNDERPRICING” 
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CHAPTER 2 - IPO UNDERPRICING 
 
2.1 - UNDERPRICING PHENOMENON  
The existence of the underpricing phenomenon has been well-documented by literature. Several 
researches and studies examining the underpricing of initial public offerings have been carried 
out since the early ‘70s. As reported by Pazarzi (2014, p.281), “for the 40-year period between 
1969 and 2010 there have been conducted more than 150 empirical studies regarding the 
underpricing of the IPOs”. Reilly (1973) and Ibbotson (1975) were among the first to analyse 
this phenomenon; since then, different theories and models have been built to explain the 
reasons and factors that cause and influence IPO underpricing. 
Ritter and Welch (2002), studying a sample of 6,249 US IPOs from 1980 to 2001, found that 
the average first-day return was 18.8%; while Smith (1986), after having summarized the results 
and studies of other authors, concluded that the average underpricing exceeded 15%. However, 
the level of underpricing is cyclical; Loughran and Ritter (2004, p.5) described that: “in the 
1980s, the average first-day return on initial public offerings (IPOs) was 7%. The average first-
day return doubled to almost 15% during 1990-1998, before jumping to 65% during the internet 
bubble years of 1999-2000 and then reverting to 12% during 2001-2003”. The degree of 
underpricing varies also from country to country; Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001, p.37) stated 
that: “the first-day premium that investors experience is positive in virtually every country, and 
typically averages more than 15 per cent in industrialized countries and around 60 per cent in 
emerging markets, measured between subscription and the first day of trading”.  
Underpricing can be calculated using the “Raw Initial Return (RIR)” formula, which simply is 
the percentage difference between the first day closing price (,) and the IPO offer price (,):  
, = , − ,,  
Otherwise, it can be calculated using the “Market Adjusted Initial Return (MAIR)” formula, 
which also takes into consideration the general performance of the stock market in the time lag 
between the closing date of the subscription of the shares and the first day of trading: 
, = , − ,, −
, −,,  
Where , is the market index at the end of the first trading day, while , is the market 
index at the end of the shares subscription period. It is more accurate to use the “Market 
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Adjusted Initial Return” formula, since the first day closing price may be high with respect to 
the offer price only because the whole stock market has risen after the closing date of the 
subscription. 
Underpricing is an opportunity cost for a firm going public; Loughran and Ritter (2002, p.413) 
showed that “during 1990-1998, companies going public in the United States left more than 
$27 billion on the table, where the money left on the table is defined as the first-day price gain 
multiplied by the number of shares sold. […] The $27 billion left on the table is twice as large 
as the $13 billion in investment banker fees paid by the issuing companies”. In a perfect capital 
market, underpricing should not be so high and firms should not “leave money on the table” or, 
at least, not a large amount.  
Underpricing is an ongoing phenomenon that has been documented and studied almost in all 
countries, which are characterized by different company population and, above all, by different 
institutional, legal, and regulatory frameworks. Several authors have offered various theoretical 
explanations to explain IPO underpricing in any country and in any different framework. This 
chapter deals with presenting and analysing the most relevant models and theories of the 
existing literature about IPO underpricing.  
 
2.2 - REASONS AND THEORIES FOR IPO UNDERPRICING  
Underpricing has been discussed in several scientific papers and different models have been 
developed to understand the causes and reasons of this phenomenon. It is not possible to identify 
a single theory able to provide an exhaustive explanation of IPO underpricing. However, the 
most important theoretical studies are based and focused on asymmetric information; there are 
models based on information revelation, on firm’s quality signalling and on the information 
asymmetry existing between various classes of investors or between the issuer and the 
underwriter. Other possible explanations are discussed in ownership and control theories, in 
lawsuit avoidance theory and, more recently, also in behavioural theories.  
In addition to the theories trying to explain the reasons of IPO underpricing, there are also 
empirical researches that examine the factors influencing the level of underpricing, like the 
reputation of the underwriter, the market timing of the initial public offering, the pricing 
mechanism adopted, firm and economy specific factors. 
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Information Asymmetry  
Among the different asymmetric information theories, the best-known model is represented by 
Rock’s (1986) winner’s curse. This model is based on the assumption that it is possible to 
categorize investors into “informed” and “uninformed” investors. In addition, it assumes that 
the investment bank and the issuing firm are not completely informed about the “true value” of 
the shares: the investment banker and the firm are in informational disadvantage because they 
must reveal to the market all the information included in the prospectus, but, they are not able 
to obtain all the information possessed by informed investors (usually institutional investors). 
According to Rock (1986, p.190), “even though the firm and its agent know more than any 
single individual in the market, they know less than all the individuals in the market combined. 
While the investment banker is the one agent suited to price the offering, his information and 
expertise are inferior to the pooled talents and knowledge of all the agents. Some individuals 
may have inside information about a competitor that could have a significant impact upon the 
firm’s product. Others may know better than the firm or the investment banker the appropriate 
rate to discount the firm’s cash flows in the capital market”. Informed investors, taking 
advantage of their additional information, apply only for underpriced shares, while uninformed 
investors are not able to discriminate between underpriced and overpriced shares. Uninformed 
investors face a winner’s curse: they get only a small fraction of underpriced issues due to the 
high demand from informed investors, while they get full allocation of overpriced offerings 
because there is no competing demand. Consequently, knowing the winner’s curse 
phenomenon, the uninformed investors abstain from participating in the IPO, unless the 
investment bank and the issuing firm price the share at a discount. If informed demand is not 
sufficient to absorb all the shares offered, the participation of uninformed investors becomes 
essential to the success of the IPO. According to Rock, underpricing is therefore needed to 
attract uninformed investors because it ensures them, at least, a non-negative return.  
Rock’s model is intuitive and can be considered an application of Akerlof’s (1970) theory, “The 
market for Lemons”, in which uninformed buyers are in informational disadvantage and cannot 
distinguish between good quality and bad quality products: asymmetric information causes 
adverse selection and lead to market failure. One implication of “winner’s course model” is that 
the degree of underpricing should be linked with ex-ante uncertainty about the value of the firm. 
Ex-ante uncertainty reduces the investor’s ability to correctly evaluate a firm going public, and 
so, as reported by Gregoriou (2006, p.195), “the greater the ex-ante uncertainty, the greater is 
the advantage of becoming an informed investor”. Beatty and Ritter (1986) concluded that 
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underpricing increases with ex-ante uncertainty, since an increase in the number of informed 
investors intensifies the winner’s curse phenomenon.10 
Rock’s model assumptions and findings have been largely discussed in the literature. Jenkinson 
and Ljungqvist (2001) questioned the assumption that issuing firms must pay with the 
underpricing of the shares offered for the uninformed investors’ participation in the offering. 
Indeed, if the number of informed investors is not sufficient to absorb all the offering, the 
uninformed ones could invest through institutional-informed investors (for example using 
investment funds) in order to exploit their superior information (in exchange for a fee) and not 
subscribe overpriced shares.  
Hanley and Wilhelm (1995), instead, studying a sample of 38 IPOs managed by a single 
underwriter, found that approximately 70% of shares of underpriced issues are allocated to 
institutional investors but also that “institutional investors take similar large position in 
overpriced offering” and that “institutional investors are allocated large proportion of issues for 
which pre-offer interest is weak and also of issues for which it is strong” (Hanley and Wilhelm, 
1995, p.240). These findings can be interpreted as evidence against Rock’s model, according 
to which informed investors impose a winner’s curse on uninformed ones by bidding only for 
underpriced offerings.  
In addition, Rock’s model assumes that it is costless for informed and institutional investors to 
abstain from participating in overpriced issues. Nevertheless, Benveniste and Spindt (1989) 
showed that this choice can cost an investor the opportunity to take part in future (underpriced) 
offerings and, consequently, also informed investors decide to participate in less attractive 
issues. Finally, it is important to take into consideration that Rock’s model can be used to 
explain underpricing only in fixed-price offering, where price is not determined by the bidding 
of investors. Indeed, winner’s curse phenomenon is not a problem in book-building mechanism, 
because the investment banks solicit investors feedbacks and information prior to the final 
pricing. 
Information asymmetry can be also observed between the issuing firm and the investment bank. 
Baron’s (1982) model takes into consideration this information asymmetry and assumes that 
investment banks have superior information about the demand level for the shares offered and 
capital markets. According to Baron, issuing firms rationally allow underwriters to underprice 
in order to compensate them for the use of their superior information. In fact, when the 
underwriter is better informed than the issuer, the pricing and distribution decisions are 
                                                          
10
 See the paragraph “The Relation Between Ex-Ante Uncertainty and Underpricing” 
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delegated to the investment bank. “The value to the issuer of the banker's distribution effort is 
an increasing function of the issuer's uncertainty, so greater uncertainty increases the demand 
for the advising and distribution services of the banker” (Baron, 1982, p.956). Investment banks 
choose the IPO price so as to optimize their unobservable distribution efforts and, so, they have 
an incentive to underprice. The greater the level of ex-ante uncertainty and the greater the 
asymmetry of information between issuer and underwriter, the greater the level of underpricing. 
However, Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1989), testing the Baron’s model, found that the 
information asymmetry existing between the issuer and the underwriter is not useful to explain 
the underpricing phenomenon. They used a small sample of 38 IPOs of investment banks going 
public without referring to other intermediaries. In other words, they selected a sample of “self-
marketed” or “self-underwritten” IPOs, in which investment banks participated in the 
distributions of their own shares. By doing so, there is no separation between the issuer and the 
underwriter and, therefore, there is no information asymmetry and there are no principal-agent 
problems. Muscarella and Vetsuypens showed that, in contrast to Baron’s findings, “self-
marketed” IPOs present statistically significant underpricing and, above all, that these IPOs are 
no less underpriced compared to traditional IPOs. 
Information asymmetry can be identified not only between investors or between issuers and 
underwriters, but also between underwriters and investors. This type of asymmetric information 
is described and used by “Information Revelation Theories”11 (or “Market Feedback 
Hypothesis”) to analyse the IPO underpricing phenomenon. Lastly, information asymmetry 
between issuers and investors is utilized by “Signaling Theory”12, in which the issuers are better 
informed about company’s present value and future cash flows and employ underpricing as a 
signal of the firm’s quality.  
 
Information Revelation Theories (Market Feedback Hypothesis) 
According to Information Revelation Theories, institutional investors have better knowledge 
than the issuer and the investment bank about the firm’s competitors, the industry and the 
economy as a whole. Investors are not incentivized to reveal positive information about their 
own demand for the shares, because this would lead to an increase in the final offer price (in 
informationally efficient market, prices reveal all available information), that is 
                                                          
11
 See next paragraph, “Information Revelation Theories” 
12
 See the paragraph “Signaling Theory” 
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disadvantageous for them. Since the disclosure of information is essential to avoid mispricing, 
underwriters must find a way to induce investors to truthfully reveal their private information. 
Benveniste and Spindt (1989) were the first to introduce “information gathering theory” and 
they pointed out that book-building could be an appropriate mechanism to induce investors to 
reveal information about the demand for shares in the pre-selling phase. As described in Chapter 
113, investors communicate their interest and submit bids (communicating the price and the 
number of shares they are willing to buy) during the road show, before the final price has been 
set. Book-building process permits the underwriter to reduce the incentive to mispresent 
positive information and to better evaluate the offerings. However, investors that truthfully 
reveal their private (positive) information and their expectations about the value of the listing 
company must be rewarded by underwriters with discretionary allocation of underpriced shares 
(book-building mechanism allows investment banks to have total discretion in allocating 
shares). “If the underwriter is doing his job well, each investor’s reward will just reflect the 
marginal value of her private information. It follows that underpricing increases in the marginal 
value of private information” (Jenkinson and Ljungqvist, 2001, p.91). Book-building permits 
to reduce uncertainty and information asymmetries. Issuers benefit from setting a final offering 
price higher than underwriter’s initial estimate (upward revision of the initial price range) and, 
deliberately, “leave some money on the table” because, in the absence of underpricing, investors 
would not have interest in revealing their positive information. 
Cornelli and Goldreich (1999) findings support “information gathering theory”. They 
investigated 39 international equity issues conducted using book-building procedure and they 
found that underwriters allocate large fractions of shares to investors that reveal information in 
their bids. Specifically, Cornelli and Goldreich (1999, p.3) found that “bidders who reveal 
information through limit prices14 are awarded more shares than similar bidders who submit 
quantity bids without price limits. Similarly, bidders who revise their bids - which can be 
interpreted as providing information as it arises over time - are subject to more favourable 
treatment in the allocation of shares”, and that “bidders from the issuer’s country receive a 
favourable allocation, especially in issues with low oversubscription. Since local investors are 
typically viewed as better informed, this favourable treatment may be again seen as a 
remuneration for the revelation of information”.  
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 See IPO Pricing (Book-Building Mechanism, Fixed-price Offerings and Auctions) 
14
 “The presence of limit prices provides additional information, which tells the investment banker how demand 
varies within the preannounced price range.” (Cornelli and Goldreich, 1999, p.2) 
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Another support to Benveniste and Spindt theory is provided by Hanley (1993). She showed 
that the new positive information collected during book-building process is only partially 
incorporated in the final offer price. Hanley (1993, p.249) demonstrated also that “underpricing 
is positively related to revisions in the offer price from the filing of the preliminary prospectus 
to the offer date. […] Issues that have positive revisions in the offer price and good information 
revealed are significantly more underpriced than other IPOs”. 
A contribution to Information Revelation Theories is supplied also by Benveniste and Wilhelm 
(1990). They stated that the optimal mechanism to acquire information from informed investors 
is price discrimination and that underwriters need to use a combination of price and allocation 
discrimination to maximize proceeds. If investment banks could offer underprice shares only 
to well-informed investors, their incentive to truthfully reveal positive information would be 
stronger and issuers would leave less money on the table. As reported by Bennouri and 
Falconieri (2001, p.3), “the authors [Benveniste and Wilhelm] show that, the less discretion the 
intermediary has, the smaller the issuing firm’s profit is. They conclude that, the seller is better 
off when he can use both instruments, price and quantity discrimination. This however is not 
what we observe in practice”. Indeed, regulatory constraints generally forbid price 
discrimination among investors and, consequently, investment banks must underprice the issue 
to all IPO subscribers, without rewarding only informed ones.  
In addition, Benveniste and Wilhelm also studied the interaction between Rock’s winner’s curse 
and information revelation. They demonstrated that, when underwriters are able to extract 
information from well-informed investors using book-building mechanism, both the 
information asymmetries among investors and between investors and underwriters are reduced. 
Consequently, it is reduced the winner’s curse problem for uninformed subscribers and then the 
level of underpricing. 
In contrast with Information Revelation Theories and with Cornelli and Goldreich findings, 
Jenkinson and Jones (2004), after having analysed 27 European IPOs managed by different 
underwriters, concluded that there is no evidence that well-informed investors receive larger 
allocation. They found that underwriters discriminate only between long-term and short-term 
investors and that long-term shareholders are constantly preferred in allocation. Their “results 
cast doubt upon the extent of information production during the bookbuilding period” 
(Jenkinson and Jones, 2004, p.2309). 
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Signaling Theory  
Unlike Information Revelation Theories and Rock’s assumptions, Signaling Theory supposes 
that companies (especially issuing companies’ managers) are the well-informed party and have 
better information about the firm’s value and future prospects than investors. Underpricing is 
seen as a signal of firm’s quality and it is used by high quality firms to convince potential 
subscribers of their true value. 
The first to introduce the concept of “Market Signaling” was Spence (1973), who described and 
analysed the role of signalling in the job market. He assumed that there are different quality 
workers and that employers cannot verify workers’ quality before the hiring. According to 
Spence, “high-quality” prospective workers use education level as a signal of their high 
productivity. 
The original intuition to IPO signalling theory came from Ibbotson (1975), who stated that 
issuers deliberately underprice to “leave a good taste in investors’ mouths so that future 
underwritings from the same issuers could be sold at attractive prices” (Ibbotson, 1975, p.264). 
Other applications of signalling models to explain IPO underpricing were provided by Allen 
and Faulhaber (1989), Grinblatt and Hwang (1989) and Welch (1989).  
Allen and Faulhaber (1989) built a model in which there are only two types of firms: good and 
bad. The quality of the firm is defined in terms of expected dividend streams15. Only firms 
know the type to which they belong, and issuers are risk-neutral: they want to maximize 
expected proceeds that are the sum of issuing proceeds from initial public offerings and 
subsequent seasoned offerings. Good firms signal their quality through the initial offering price: 
the level of underpricing is positively linked with the quality of the firm. Allen and Faulhaber 
(1989, p.304) affirmed that “underpricing the firm’s initial offerings (which is an immediate 
loss to the initial owners) is a credible signal that the firm is good to investors, because only 
good firms can be expected to recoup this loss after their performance is realized. […] The 
owners of bad firms know their expected performance and subsequent market valuation. They 
know they cannot recoup the initial loss from underpricing, and so cannot afford to signal”. 
Grinblatt and Hwang model (1989) is similar to the one proposed by Allen and Faulhaber. 
Company’s managers are well-informed about firm’s future cash flow, while investors have 
little knowledge about project cash flow and their variance. Issuing firms use two different 
signals: the degree of underpricing and fractional holding (companies use a combination of 
retained shares and IPO underpricing). They showed that the decision to retain part of the shares 
                                                          
15
 “Good firms have higher expected dividend streams than bad firms” (Allen and Faulhaber, 1989, p.307) 
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issued, is a signal of managers’ optimism about firm’ future prospects. They observed positive 
relationship between the retention rate and initial returns, and also between the level of 
underpricing and the value of the firm. 
Finally, Welch (1989) built a model in which he assumed that firms are rational actors with 
superior information operating in a perfectly competitive capital market. The main assumption 
is that low quality firms must incur high imitation cost to appear to be high quality firms. 
However, investors may be able to find out the firm’s true quality after the IPO and before 
seasoned offerings; the cost of underpricing can induce low quality firms to voluntarily reveal 
their quality. Welch demonstrated that the cost of signaling is lower for high quality firms and 
that the degree of underpricing is positively correlated with the firm quality. “The model 
strongly suggests that IPO firms pursue a multiple issue strategy when they choose both the 
price and the proportion of the firm they offer at their IPO. The reason why IPO underpricing 
results in a higher SO [seasoned offering] price is an information asymmetry between firm 
owners and investors. High-quality firm owners can signal their superior information to 
investors because their marginal cost of underpricing is lower than the marginal cost of 
underpricing for low-quality firm owners” (Welch, 1989, p.445).  
 
Ownership Dispersion Hypothesis  
A different category of models explaining underpricing is focused on the changes of the 
ownership structure and, above all, on the ownership dispersion caused by an IPO process. 
Indeed, the going public process engenders the separation of ownership and control. Before the 
IPO, ownership is generally concentrated with few owners or entrepreneurs, monitoring is not 
a problem for investors and there is no a liquid market for shares. Listing provides liquidity to 
pre-IPO shareholders and produces dispersed ownership. The greater dispersion of shareholders 
has direct and important effects on management’s incentive and control, and causes agency 
problems between managing shareholders and dispersed investors. 
Zingales (1995) and Booth and Chua (1996) were the first to deeply investigate the connection 
between the going public decision, the ownership’s structure changes and IPO underpricing. 
Zingales said that issuing companies use initial public offering to optimize their ownership 
structure and that “the decision of a firm to go public is the result of a value-maximizing 
decision made by an initial owner who wants to eventually sell his company” (Zingales, 1995, 
p.426) He showed that a more diffuse ownership allows controlling shareholder to obtain a 
higher price when selling its controlling stake. So, owners create diffuse ownership using an 
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IPO and maintain a controlling block of shares to extract more surplus from a future potential 
buyer. 
Booth and Chua (1996) built a model in which they demonstrated that the issuer’s demand for 
broad ownership dispersion creates an incentive to underprice shares. Underpricing and 
oversubscription help initial ownership dispersion, and this results in a more liquid secondary 
market. Booth and Chua (1996, p.307) showed that “secondary market liquidity increases with 
the level of oversubscription and ownership dispersion, which in turn increases total 
information costs and underpricing”. The explanation provided by the model is not mutually 
exclusive of other explanations of IPO underpricing (e.g. Rock’s winner’s curse, Signaling 
Theory, Information Revelation Theory). The empirical results show that underpricing is a 
positive function of ownership dispersion. 
The most known model about ownership dispersion is the one developed by Brennan and 
Franks (1997). They studied a sample of 69 IPOs issued in the UK between 1986 and 1989 and 
they showed that underpricing is used by issuing company’s managers to retain control. 
According to Brennan and Franks, underpricing typically produces oversubscription and it is 
followed by rationing in the share allocation. Owners have the possibility to perform strategic 
share allocation; indeed, when owners wish to maintain the control of the firm after the IPO, 
they deliberately underprice the issue and ensure oversubscription: this reduces the possibility 
of a hostile takeover because it permits the owners to discriminate between the potential 
subscribers. Shares are then rationed to investors in order to reduce the block size of new 
shareholders: “the discrimination is usually against large applicants and in favour of smaller 
applicants” (Brennan and Franks, 1997, p.412). The greater dispersion also permits the 
incumbent managers to avoid constant monitoring by a new large shareholder. Some authors 
argued that new shareholders can always buy shares in the secondary market, obtain a large 
block of shares and so start a hostile takeover. However, when a large investor is expected to 
put together a large stake and to change the ownership structure of the firm, the share price 
increases and, as stated by Shleifer and Vishny (1986, p.464), “if ownership structure is initially 
very diffuse and trading is public, it is not profitable to assemble a large block of shares”. The 
results of the model confirmed “that the size of the underpricing is negatively related to the size 
of large blocks assembled after the IPO, which is consistent with underpricing being an 
effective mechanism to secure a diffuse outside shareholding” (Brennan and Franks, 1997, 
p.412). 
In contrast with Brennan and Franks, Stoughton and Zechner (1998) developed a model in 
which rationing in the share allocation is used to favour large rather than small investors, in 
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order to enhance monitoring on management and reduce agency problems. They argued that 
ownership structure can affect the efficiency of corporate governance and consequently firm 
value. Different investors have different capabilities to monitor managerial actions: large 
shareholders are better suited and equipped to perform monitoring activities. Investment banks 
and issuer should so offer favoured treatment to large investors. If price discrimination is not 
feasible, issuing firms can favour some investors through allocation of large fraction of 
underpriced shares: in fact, Stoughton and Zechner (1998, p.47) sustained that “rationing 
provides a mechanism whereby different classes of investors may be treated differentially, 
although they all purchases securities at a common price”. Their model generated several 
empirical predictions: the most important is that rationing in favour of large investors should 
be positively linked with underpricing. Nevertheless, results and international evidence are not 
conclusive about the accuracy of these predictions.  
 
Lawsuit Avoidance Theory  
A completely different explanation of underpricing phenomenon is discussed in Lawsuit 
Avoidance theories. The idea behind these theories was first introduced by Logue (1973) and 
Ibbotson (1975) and it is quite simple: underpricing is used as a mean of insurance against future 
litigation and possible lawsuits from shareholders. Lawsuits can be time-consuming and very 
costly to issuing firms, not only directly (costs linked with legal fees or the opportunity costs 
of management time) but also in terms of reputation costs. Firms going public and their 
managers have an incentive to insure against these costs: underpricing is deliberately used to 
reduce the probability of being sued for misstatements or omissions in the prospectus and for 
bad stock price performance. 
The principal support to Lawsuit Avoidance Theory was provided by Tinic (1988) and by 
Hughes and Takhor (1992). Tinic suggested that IPO underpricing serves as insurance against 
legal liability and reputation damage. He analysed two samples of IPOs: the first included IPOs 
performed from 1923 to 1930 (before the Security Act of 1933), while the second sample 
included IPOs from 1966 to 1971 (after the Security Act of 1933). The Security Act of 1933 
was the first relevant legislation regarding the offer and sale of securities and increased firms’ 
disclosure and liability requirements: this also increased the risk of future litigation with 
shareholder. According to Tinic, the higher is the risk of future litigation, the higher should be 
the underpricing applied by the issuing firm. The empirical results reported in his work 
confirmed its hypothesis: the underpricing was significantly lower for IPOs performed before 
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1933, when the lawsuit avoidance was not a real problem, and increased after the Security Act 
became effective. 
Hughes and Takhor (1992, pp.709-710) developed a richer model to analyse if “the risk of 
future litigation can induce an underwriter to purposely sell an initial public offering (IPO) at a 
discount relative to the value assessed by the underwriter”. They pointed out that there are 
several circumstances in which litigation risks induce firms and investment banks to underprice. 
Nevertheless, they concluded that, even if a link between litigation risk and underpricing exists 
and can be found in most IPOs, the litigation risk is not the only cause of underpricing 
phenomenon and they observed that “underpricing occurs even in countries where litigation 
risk is not a factor” (Hughes and Takhor, 1992, p.737). 
Lowry and Shu (2002) contributed to this theory. They started from the fact that litigation is 
costly and that firms wish to reduce litigation risks and insure against such costs. They noted 
that firms can lower the probability of being sued by conducting an accurate due diligence prior 
to the IPO and by decreasing the potential damages for IPO investors using underpricing. In 
their paper, they wanted to simultaneously analyse: “whether litigation risk affects IPO issuers’ 
incentives to underprice their issues [the insurance effect] and whether underpricing lowers the 
expected litigation costs by reducing lawsuit probabilities [the deterrence effect]” (Lowry and 
Shu, 2002, p.311). In their investigation, Lowry and Shu found evidence and support for both 
the insurance and the deterrence effects linked with litigation risks. In particular, they 
demonstrated that “firms with higher litigation risk underprice their IPOs by significantly 
greater amount” and that “firms that engage in more underpricing significantly lower their 
litigation risks” (Lowry and Shu, 2002, p.333). 
 
Behavioural Theories  
Other models that are still at a development and testing stage can be categorised as Behavioural 
Theories: these theories assert that the underpricing is the result of investors’ behavioural 
biases. The most relevant support to this hypothesis came from Welch (1992) and Ritter (1998).  
Welch (1992) proposed an explanation of IPO underpricing based on information “cascade” 
effect. He showed that investors rely completely on the information inferred from previous sales 
and on the purchasing decision of other investors and thus create information “cascade” by 
following sequential sales: they tend to ignore their own private information and act like the 
previous investors. “As a consequence, if a few early investors believe that the offering is 
overpriced, they can swamp the information held by all other investors and doom the offering 
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to fail. Or, if a few early investors believe that the offering is a bargain, they can create almost 
unlimited demand for this issue” (Welch, 1992, p.696). Book-building discourage this kind of 
behaviour16 and Information Cascade Theory can be, in general, applied in fixed-price 
offerings. Late investors observe whether early investors purchased or abstained from 
participating in the offerings, so issuing firms need to underprice in order to create high demand 
from early investors and to start a positive cascade. Indeed, Welch demonstrated that overpriced 
offerings are not successful but only underpriced ones succeed: this is the reason why issuing 
firms apply high level of underpricing when pricing their IPOs. 
In agreement with Welch, Ritter (1998) argued that the IPO market can be characterized by 
bandwagon effects. These effects develop when investors take into consideration not only their 
own information but also the decisions of other investors: an investor is not willing to buy 
stocks from an IPO, if other investors are not buying. So, investor’s decisions are strongly 
influenced by other investors’ actions and late investors generally follow the choices of early 
ones. To take advantage of this effect, “an issuer may want to underprice an issue to induce the 
first few potential investors to buy, and induce a bandwagon, or cascade, in which all 
subsequent investors want to buy irrespective of their own information” (Ritter, 1998, p.9). 
 
2.3 - FACTORS THAT AFFECT THE LEVEL OF UNDERPRICING  
As it is possible to note from previous paragraphs, there is no a unique and universal explanation 
of IPO underpricing, but there are several theories and models developed to explain this 
phenomenon. A relevant challenge for authors and researchers is represented by the fact that it 
is not easy to test the assumptions behind models and analyse the empirical results obtained. In 
addition to the theories regarding the reasons why companies leave money on the table, there 
are also other studies regarding the main factors and variables that affect the level of initial 
underpricing. Among these studies, there are some which focus on the relation between 
underpricing and ex-ante uncertainty. 
 
The Relation between Ex-Ante Uncertainty and Underpricing  
According to Beatty and Ritter (1986), the greater the ex-ante uncertainty about an offering’s 
value, the greater the expected underpricing. They defined ex-ante uncertainty as the 
                                                          
16
 “In book-building, cascades do not develop because the underwriter can maintain secrecy over the development 
of demand in the book.” (Jenkinson and Ljungqvist, 2001, p.95) 
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uncertainty about the intrinsic value per share when a company becomes listed and they used 
two proxies for it: the inverse of the gross proceeds raised in an offering and the log of one plus 
the number of uses of proceeds listed in the prospectus. Other similar studies, investigating the 
relation between ex-ante uncertainty and underpricing, used different uncertainty proxies that 
can be grouped into five categories: company characteristics, offering characteristics, 
prospectus disclosure, certification and after-market variables. Beatty and Ritter (1986, p.227) 
demonstrated that “there is a positive relation between the ex-ante uncertainty about an initial 
public offering’s value and its expected initial return”.  
Ritter (1991) confirmed that the smaller is the offering, the higher is the initial return and 
showed also that there is a negative relation between firm’s age (at the time of going public) 
and the level of underpricing. The younger is the firm, the higher is the expected underpricing, 
“consistent with the notions that risky issues require higher average initial return and that age 
is a proxy for this risk” (Ritter, 1991, p.20). Indeed, newly created firms generally exhibit higher 
ex-ante uncertainty than old and well-established firms. 
Hanley (1993) provided another proxy for the ex-ante uncertainty surrounding an issue. He 
stated that the ex-ante risk of an issue can be measured using both the percent width of the offer 
price range and the expected size of the offering. Wider price range are set when the investment 
banks are unsure about the valuation and the price of an issue: “the wider the offer range, 
therefore, the greater the uncertainty about the true value of the issue” (Hanley, 1993, p.239). 
Instead, James and Wier (1990) found that the existence of a borrowing relationship reduces 
the ex-ante uncertainty about the value of the issuing firm’s equity in the secondary market. 
According to them, the presence of established credit relationships reduces the uncertainty and, 
consequently, the degree of IPO underpricing. Their empirical results provided evidence that 
IPOs of firms with previously established borrowing relationships and with borrowing histories 
are underpriced substantially less than other initial public offerings. 
  
The Relation between the Reputation of the Underwriter and Underpricing  
Another important factor that influence the level of IPO underpricing is the reputation of the 
underwriter. Generally, due to information asymmetry problems, issuers need to underprice the 
issues to stimulate investors’ demand and attract IPO subscribers. Nevertheless, some authors 
stated that the degree of information asymmetry can be reduced by employing highly reputable 
and prestigious underwriters: high quality investment banks are assumed to accurately present 
information in the prospectus and so reduce the extent of information asymmetry. Empirical 
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evidence showed that IPOs conducted by more reputable underwriters are linked to lower initial 
returns, that means lower underpricing. 
Logue (1973), after having examined a sample of 250 IPOs, found significant differences in the 
average initial return between the IPOs performed by prestigious and non-prestigious 
investment banks. According to Logue, the reputation of the underwriter represents a signal 
used by potential investors to evaluate the risk associated with the IPO and the quality of the 
issuing firm. Consistent with this hypothesis, Carter and Manaster (1990) demonstrated that 
underwriter reputation is inversely related to short-run underpricing and that more prestigious 
and reputable underwriters are linked to less risky initial public offerings.  
Underwriters and auditors with high reputation certify the quality of the issuing firms and the 
fairness of the offer price and, consequently, encourage uninformed investors to participate in 
the IPO. Titman and Trueman (1986) showed that issuers that have favourable information 
about firm’s value tend to select prestigious underwriters and auditors: “when a firm sells shares 
for the first time its true value is imperfectly known by investors and the quality of the auditor 
and investment banker chosen by the firm’s owner provides information to the market about 
that value” (Titman and Trueman, 1986, p.159). 
Firms’ owners wish to reduce and minimize underpricing since it represents an important cost 
for issuing firm; so, firms wish to select reputable underwriters that have access to better 
information, provide better estimates of the issue and set a higher final offering price. However, 
high quality auditors and prestigious investment banks charge higher fees and only managers 
that have favourable information about the issuing firm’ value have an incentive to engage 
reputable underwriters. Beatty (1989) found that also high-quality auditors are associated with 
less underpriced IPOs and confirmed that the lower underpricing is compensated by higher fees: 
“value-maximising owners of IPO firms will choose the auditing firm with reputation capital 
that equates the marginal benefit of less underpricing with the marginal cost of a higher quality 
audit” (Beatty, 1989, p.696). 
Several papers and studies have described and tested the relation between underwriter 
reputation and underpricing. Different authors have used several different proxies and measures 
of underwriter reputation, but all concluded that underpricing is negatively related to the quality 
of investment banks. It is important to underline that most studies have been conducted in US 
market and it is not appropriate to extend these findings to other markets, without taking into 
consideration the different characteristics of these markets. In emerging markets, the 
information asymmetry is more severe, the informational efficiency is lower, it is more 
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expensive for investors to collect information and it might be more difficult for investors to 
assess underwriters’ and auditors’ reputation as compared with developed markets. So, “even 
though prior research documents the significant negative impact of underwriter reputation on 
IPO performance in the US market, it may not be plausible to expect such a relationship to exist 
for IPOs in an emerging market” (Guner, Onder and Danisoglu, 2004, p.4). 
 
2.4 - MARKET TIMING OF IPO AND THE IMPACT ON THE LEVEL OF 
UNDERPRICING  
Important determinants of IPO underpricing are also market cycles: cycles exist in both the 
volume and the average initial return of initial public offerings. As it is possible to observe from 
Figure 2, the number of IPOs are not randomly distributed over time but there are clear signs 
of positive autocorrelation: high-volume periods are almost always followed by further high-
volume periods.  
As shown by Sindelar, Ritter and Ibbotson (1994), the same phenomenon happens for average 
initial returns: like IPO volume, also the degree of underpricing is cyclical and periods of high 
initial returns generally last for several months. Periods characterised by high average initial 
returns and an unusually high volume of offerings are known as “hot issue” market (from Figure 
2, it is possible to note the “hot issue” market of the late 1990s in US). “Cold” IPO markets, 
Figure 2 - Ibbotson, Sindelar and Ritter's (1994) data on number of US IPOs per month and average initial 
return by month. Updated on Jay Ritter's website to cover the period January 1960 - August 2001.  
Source: Lowry, M. and Schwert, G.W., 2002 (p.1174). 
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instead, are characterised by low degree of underpricing, low issuing volume and few instances 
of oversubscription.  
It is not easy to find a rational explanation for the existence of “hot issue” market. Ritter (1984) 
introduced the “changing risk composition” hypothesis, which explained that riskier IPOs tend 
to be underpriced more than less risky IPOs and so, if there are periods in which firms going 
public are riskier than in other periods, the period with riskier firms will be characterised by 
higher underpricing. Another possible explanation is linked to the fact that underpricing is 
positively autocorrelated and that investors can predict future initial returns with considerable 
accuracy: if investors chase trend and follow “positive feedback” strategies, “they may end up 
causing the expected positive autocorrelation of initial returns in a kind of self-fulfilling 
prophecy” (Sindelar, Ritter and Ibbotson, 1994, p.72). Moreover, Ritter (1991) argued that the 
market goes through temporary “windows of opportunity”: periods in which IPOs can be sold 
at relatively high valuation multiple due to the over-optimistic investor behaviour. Issuers try 
to successfully time their IPOs to take advantage of these “windows of opportunity” and exploit 
favourable market sentiment. 
It is difficult to find out a connection between IPOs timing and investor sentiment because 
“sentiment is an intangible attitude that defies easy quantification” (Draho, 2004, p.14). 
However, it can be investigated whether there exists a link between IPOs timing and industry 
valuations surrounding the IPO date. Lerner (1994, p.294), studying a sample of 350 
biotechnology IPOs from 1979 to 1992, showed that “venture capitalists successfully time IPOs 
by being more likely to take companies public when their valuations are at their absolute and 
short-run peaks” and concluded that “IPOs are far more likely to occur when the equity values 
are high” (p.300). Furthermore, Rajan and Servaes (1997) demonstrated that there is a positive 
relation between the number of IPOs from an industry in a given quarter and long-term growth 
projections for recent IPOs in the same industry. They added that “growth projections are overly 
optimistic. Hence, these results suggest that firms take advantage of this optimism by raising 
funds from the public” (Rajan and Servaes, 1997, p.509). 
In conclusion, the flow of IPOs is not constant. Firms need to consider the trade-off between 
costs and benefits of going public that vary over time; indeed, not only stock market valuations 
and market sentiments vary, but also listing requirements, stock exchange regulations, 
commissions paid to intermediaries and other factors can change and influence the IPO timing 
decision. Normally, firms have the option to go public at any time and finding the right IPO 
timing is a crucial decision. Private firms wait for “windows of opportunity” and period of high 
investor sentiment to maximize IPO proceeds. Issuing firms conduct their IPO during periods 
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of high stock market valuations also because “for a given funding need a higher offer price 
implies less dilution” (Jenkinson and Ljungqvist, 2001, p.47). Rarely private firms go public 
after a market downturn but delay their IPO process until favourable market conditions are re-
established. 
 
2.5 - UNDERPRICING IN DIFFERENT COUNTRIES AND IN DIFFERENT 
ECONOMIC SECTORS 
The presence of underpricing phenomenon in the IPO market has been frequently studied and 
largely confirmed. Although most studies have analysed US stock market and have focused on 
US IPOs, empirical studies provide evidence about the presence of underpricing also in every 
other studied market. Figure 3 reports the level of IPO underpricing by country of listing: it is 
possible to note that there are important differences in the average initial underpricing across 
countries.  
The level of underpricing varies from country to country: it is higher in Asian market than in 
more developed countries. China, India and Malaysia have the highest average underpricing 
(almost 120% in China in the period 1990-2013). In US average underpricing is about 17% 
(registered in the period 1960-2014), while it is lower in Canada (6.5% in the period 1971-
2013) and in Argentina (only 4% in the period 1991-2013). In European countries, the average 
underpricing is very high in Greece (approximately 50% in the period 1976-2013) and Sweden 
(more than 27% in the period 1980-2011), while it is more limited in Italy (15% in the period 
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Figure 3 - Average Return by Country. Source: own illustration based on data from Loughran, Ritter et al. (1994) 
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1985-2013), France (10.5% in the period 1983-2010) and Spain (10% in the period 1986-
2013).17  
These relevant cross-country differences are, above all, related to institutional differences that 
arise from binding regulations, contractual mechanisms and to the characteristics of firms going 
public. Nguema and Sentis (2006) showed also that the differences in the level of underpricing 
could be explained by the country risk, that is a non-financial risk. They demonstrated that 
“countries exhibiting the strongest country risk have their financial markets more subject to 
IPO underpricing” (Nguema and Sentis, 2006, p.3). 
Other studies investigated whether underpricing varies in different economic sectors. Economic 
sectors can be classified into the following categories: industry, bank and insurance, new 
technologies, and other services. “Industrial firms and banks and insurance companies have 
equivalent initial returns, the latter being less underpriced than other services. Among all 
categories, new technology companies are the most underpriced” (Gajewski and Gresse, 2006, 
p.39). Lowry and Schewert (2002) showed that high-tech companies (biotech, computer 
equipment, electronics, communications, & general technology) are more underpriced than 
low-tech companies and also that non-technology firms have the lowest level of underpricing. 
In addition, Loughran and Ritter (2004), after having studied a sample of 6,391 IPOs conducted 
in the period from 1980 to 2003, confirmed that tech and internet related companies are 
characterized by higher initial returns than non-technology firms. They showed that during the 
“Dot-com Bubble” (1999-2000), the average level of underpricing for technological companies 
was much higher than for other firms (more than 80% and approximately 23% respectively), 
but also in the two decades before and in the years after the bubble, the initial returns for tech 
and internet related firms were higher than for other companies. Finally, Gregoriou (2006, 
p.227) stated that “IPOs of the new economy [Media, Pharma and Healthcare, Software, 
Technology and Telecommunication] account not only for the most excessive underpricing, but 
also for the highest negative first-day return”. These findings can be explained by considering 
that high tech industry is still relatively young and that technological companies entail higher 
risks. Indeed, these firms are difficult to be evaluated due to their large proportion of intangible 
assets and to their uncertain growth prospects: all this increases information asymmetries 
between firms’ owners and potential investors. The risky nature of high-tech companies is also 
linked to the fact that they are exposed to technology innovation and their product cycles are 
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 Source of data: Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist, 1994. 
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usually of short duration. Consequently, issuers in high-tech companies strongly underprice 
their IPOs to overcome information asymmetries and signal the true value of the firm. 
 
2.6 - THE LONG-RUN PERFORMANCE OF INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS 
In addition to the short-run underpricing and to the “hot issue” market phenomena, a third 
anomaly (or stylized fact) in the IPO market documented by literature is the long-run 
underperformance. Ritter (1991) was the first to provide evidence of this phenomenon. He 
analysed 1,526 US IPOs in the 1975-1984 period and found that “in the 3 years after going 
public these firms significantly underperformed a set of comparable firms matched by size and 
industry” (Ritter, 1991, p.3). Subsequent researches and studies investigated different samples 
and other markets and confirmed Ritter’s findings.  
Loughran and Ritter (1995) enlarged the sample used and the period considered by Ritter in his 
initial study. They showed that companies issuing stocks significantly underperform, if 
compared to non-issuing firms, for 5 years after the offering date. “The average annual return 
during the five years after issuing is only 5 percent for firms conducting IPOs, and only 7 
percent for firms conducting SEOs. Investing an equal amount at the same time in a non-issuing 
firm with approximately the same market capitalization, and holding it for an identical period, 
would have produced an average compound return of 12 percent per year for IPOs and 15 
percent for SEOs” (Loughran and Ritter, 1995, p.46). Particularly, they found out that the 
underperformance is not present in the first six months after the offering date but it is substantial 
in the next 18 months, while in the sixth and seventh year it is only about 1 percent. A similar 
study was conducted by Levis (1993) in UK market. He showed that firms going public between 
1980 and 1988 in UK significantly underperformed in the 36 months after the day of listing and 
so that long-run underperformance is not a characteristic only of US IPOs; he added also that 
IPOs with the highest initial return had a 36-months performance notably worse than IPOs with 
more limited initial return.  
As for the underpricing phenomenon, various reasons and explanations have been given and 
analysed also for the long-run underperformance. Some authors argued that the phenomenon is 
linked with the IPO timing decision. If managers successfully time their IPOs to take advantage 
of “windows of opportunity” and exploit the over-optimistic investor sentiment, they will be 
able to set a high final offer price. Nevertheless, Helwege and Liang (2004, p.3) found 
“evidence consistent with the view that excessively positive investor sentiment during hot 
markets lead to long-term underperformance”. The “window of opportunity” may be 
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determined also by company’s performance and not only by market conditions. Indeed, 
managers may decide to start the IPO process when the firm is performing well and so take 
advantage of the firm’s high-performance to exploit analysts’ higher valuations. Ali (1996, p.1) 
investigated “whether the market's estimates of future earnings of IPO and SEO firms are 
optimistically biased during the post-issue period”, and demonstrated that analysts tend to be 
more optimistic in their earnings estimates for issuing firms than for non-issuing firms (in the 
five years following the offer date). In accordance with Ali, Rajan and Servaes (1997) 
confirmed that IPOs are conducted when analysts are particularly optimist about firms’ growth 
prospects and concluded that, in the long run, IPOs with low forecast growth rates have better 
stock performance and outperform IPOs with high forecast growth rates.  
Other authors, instead, stated that young companies, that decide to go public, are usually 
characterized by high rates of growth: this can explain and justify high valuations made by 
investors and analysts in the pre-IPO period and in the first months after the offering date. Jain 
and Kini (1994) found that, after the IPO, operating performance declines over time and 
subsequently investors’ valuations are revised downward, which results in low stock returns in 
the long-run. Similar findings were also provided by Mikkelson and Shah (1994): they showed 
that, after the offering date, operating performance worsens, market adjusted stock returns are 
negative and finally that there is “a positive correlation between the changes in operating 
performance and the post-offering stock returns” (Mikkelson and Shah, 1994, p.1). 
A different explanation for the long-term underperformance is linked with agency costs 
hypothesis. The great dispersion of shareholders caused by the IPO can create conflicts between 
managers and new investors. In fact, as existing managers’ ownership decreases, also their 
incentive to maximize firm value rather than private benefits decreases. The higher the 
proportion of equity sold to new shareholders, the weaker are managerial incentives to 
maximize firm value and, consequently, the worse is the firm operating performance after the 
IPO. On the contrary, if managers maintain large equity stakes, the company will have good 
performance also in the long-term. This hypothesis was tested by Mikkelson, Partch and Shah 
(1997). They studied the changes in the ownership structure and in the operating performance 
of the firm. They found out that ownership become considerably less concentrated and, in 
particular, that there is a long-term decline in ownership of officers and directors. They 
documented also the deterioration of the operating performance in the first years after the 
offering date; nevertheless, they concluded that the long-run operating performance is unrelated 
to the ownership structure and to the post-offer ownership stake of officers and directors. 
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The theoretical explanations of long-term underperformance provided by different authors 
remain speculative in nature and find weak support from empirical evidence. Few studies have 
tried to explain both short-term underpricing and long-run underperformance in a unique model. 
Although researchers have widely documented the abnormal performance of IPO shares both 
in the few months after the listing and in the long-term, “economist do not yet know what (if 
anything) causes initial public offerings to perform poorly in the long run” (Jenkinson and 
Ljungqvist, 2001, p.58).
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CHAPTER 3 – EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON INTERNET IPOs 
 
3.1 - INTRODUCTION  
This chapter is focused on an empirical research performed on internet-related IPOs. The aim 
of this research is to analyse a sample of US internet-related IPOs in order to describe the level 
of their initial returns and how it varies over time, and to find out which are the most important 
internet firms’ characteristics influencing the underpricing of their initial public offerings. 
The available literature on the internet-related IPOs is mainly focused on the period of the 
Internet Bubble and on the comparison between internet and non-internet IPOs. Some of the 
most important authors, like Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2002) and Loughran and Ritter (2004), 
tried to explain the reasons and the causes of the extremely high levels of initial returns reached 
during the “Dot-com bubble” by internet IPOs and all IPOs in general. Ritter and Welch (2002) 
analysed the increase in the percentage of tech and internet related IPOs (on total IPOs) over 
time, while Loughran and Ritter (2004) studied the trend of the IPO first-day return and 
demonstrated that the increase in the average level of underpricing is also related to the increase 
in the portion of IPOs conducted by young tech and internet-related firms. Ljungqvist and 
Wilhelm (2002) examined the IPO pricing process during the “Dot-com bubble” and studied 
the levels of underpricing, analysing both the characteristics of the internet firms that went 
public in that period and other important elements of the IPOs, like pre-IPO ownership structure 
and insider selling. Several other authors, for example Lowry and Schwert (2002) and Giudici 
and Roosenboom (2002), showed that, on average, technology and internet IPOs are more 
underpriced than non-technology and non-internet IPOs, and described the differences in IPO 
valuations between non-internet and internet firms. 
This research, instead, is focused only on internet-related IPOs; the aim is not to compare the 
performance of IPOs in different sectors and observe how internet IPOs perform with respect 
to other IPOs, but to analyse only the IPOs in the internet sector and find out which are the most 
important internet firms’ characteristics and factors which influence their IPO initial returns. 
Indeed, this research describes and studies internet IPOs, analysing the trend of the average 
underpricing, the distribution of IPO initial returns, the volume of IPOs in different years, the 
percentage of underpriced IPOs and the most relevant differences between underpriced and 
overpriced internet IPOs. I decided to analyse internet IPOs because some of the most important 
and largest IPOs (both in terms of capital raised and market capitalization of the issuing firms) 
occurred in recent years are internet-related IPOs; among the most important IPOs of the last 
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15 years, the following are internet-related IPOs: Google IPO (2004), Facebook IPO (2012), 
Alibaba IPO (2014), Twitter IPO (2013), Groupon IPO (2011) and Yandex N.V. IPO (2011). 
Additionally, I decided to focus my research only on IPOs conducted in the years 2000-2013, 
since the available literature on internet-related IPOs analyses mainly the performance of these 
IPOs before and during the “Internet bubble”: for example, Loughran and Ritter (2002) 
investigated the underpricing of internet and non-internet IPOs in the years 1998-2000, 
Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2002) studied the characteristics of internet firms among a sample of 
issuing firms that went public in the period 1996-2000, while Ritter and Welch (2002) analysed 
the volume and the percentage of tech and internet-related IPOs in the years 1980-2001. 
The analysis is based on the period from 2000 to 2013, also because this period was 
characterized both by the “Dot-com Bubble” and by the financial crisis of 2007-2009, and it is 
interesting to observe how internet IPOs’ performance and volume varied differently during the 
bubble and the crisis. The sample includes only NASDAQ and NYSE IPOs, because the 
NASDAQ stock exchange is the market preferred by the most important high-tech companies 
and internet firms in the world, while the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) is the largest 
stock market in the world (by market capitalization of listed companies)18 and contains the 
biggest US blue-chip but also some of the biggest internet firms (for example, Twitter, LinkedIn 
and Alibaba). The choice of the period (2000-2013) and the selection of the market (NASDAQ 
and NYSE) were also made in order to put into context the Facebook IPO case that is presented 
and described in the fourth chapter.   
The IPO of Facebook was the biggest internet IPO conducted in the period between 2000 and 
2013. Given its dimension, Facebook’s IPO was the most anticipated and hyped internet IPO 
of that period and, contrary to investors’ expectations, it was not characterized by high initial 
underpricing but by poor stock performance in the first period after the stock debut. I decided 
to study the Facebook case (in Chapter 4) because, after having analysed almost the whole 
population of internet-related IPOs completed in the same years, Facebook’s IPO seems to be 
an outlier IPO. Comparing Facebook’s IPO to the other internet IPOs, it is possible to note that 
the performance of Facebook’s IPO is not in line both with the performance of similar IPOs (in 
terms of firms’ characteristics and period of the offering) and with the performance of the IPOs 
conducted by Facebook’s competitors. In this chapter, I describe which are the most relevant 
differences in Facebook’s offering that makes this IPO an outlier IPO; in chapter 4, instead, I 
will deeply analyse the Facebook case and the reasons behind the failure of its IPO.  
                                                          
18
 Source: “Largest stock exchange operators worldwide as of March 2017, by market capitalization of listed 
companies”, Statista (2017) 
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Next paragraphs first present the sample data used in the research, the data sources and the most 
important variables analysed. Then, it is performed the descriptive analysis of the IPOs in the 
sample, that highlights which are the principal characteristics of internet-related IPOs and the 
potential relationships between the level of underpricing and the other variables analysed. The 
final paragraph reports the most relevant results observed in the research in comparison with 
literature findings, and the most important differences between Facebook’s IPO and the other 
internet IPOs. 
 
3.2 - DATA AND DATA SOURCES 
I collected a sample composed of 214 US IPOs completed on NASDAQ and on NYSE in the 
period between May 2000 and December 2013. I selected only internet-related companies that 
belong to the following industries: computer hardware, communication equipment, electronics, 
navigation equipment, telephone equipment, communication services, software. I gathered the 
dataset using different sources, as shown in Table 1.  
IPO DATA DATA SOURCE 
- IPO Name 
- Offer Date 
- Offer Price 
- SIC Code 
Jay R. Ritter’s Website: “A list of Internet 
IPOs (1990-2013)” 
- First day closing price 
- IPO Lead Underwrites 
IPOScoop’s Website: “Scoop Track Record 
from 2000 to present” 
- Shares Offered 
- Shares Outstanding 
NASDAQ’s Website 
- Companies Incorporation Date 
Field-Ritter dataset: “Founding dates for 
10,266 firms going public in the U.S. during 
1975-2015” 
- Underwriter Reputation 
Jay R. Ritter’s Website: “IPO Underwriter 
Reputation Rankings (1980-2015)” 
Table 1 – IPO Data and Data Sources used in this Research. (Source: own illustration) 
The list of internet-related IPOs, together with their offer date, their final offer price and firms’ 
SIC (“Standard Industrial Classification”) code, has been obtained from Jay R. Ritter’s 
Website19; while the data about the first day closing price and the information about lead 
underwriters have been take from IPOScoop’s website20. The data about shares offered and 
                                                          
19
 “A list of internet IPOs (1990-2013)” available on Jay R. Ritter’s website. See https: 
//site.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipo-data/ [Accessed 21 September 2017] 
20
 “Scoop Track Record from 2000 to present” available at: https://www.iposcoop.com/scoop-track-record-from-
2000-to-present/ [Accessed 21 September 2017] 
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shares outstanding, needed to calculate both firms’ market capitalization (at the time of the IPO) 
and the ratio of shares offered to outstanding, have been collected from NASDAQ’s website; 
instead, the incorporation dates, needed to calculate the age of the companies (at time of the 
IPO), have been gathered from the Field-Ritter dataset of company founding date21. Finally, the 
information about underwriter reputation has been obtained from “IPO Underwriter Reputation 
Rankings (1980-2015)” taken from Jay R. Ritter’s website22: this dataset is based on Carter and 
Manaster rankings, which have been partially modified by Ritter, and contains the rankings for 
all underwriters in different periods of time23. 
According to Ritter’s list of US internet IPOs, there have been 230 internet-related IPOs in the 
period between May 2000 and December 2013. The sample used in this research is reduced to 
214 IPOs, after having excluded 16 IPOs for which the data were not complete or fully reliable; 
this research is so performed on almost the whole population of internet IPOs listed on 
NASDAQ and on NYSE in the analysed period. 
 
3.3 - VARIABLES DESCRIPTION 
I used several variables to study and describe the internet IPOs in the sample. In the descriptive 
analysis reported in the following paragraphs, IPO first-day return (also called “Initial Return”) 
is calculated as the percentage difference between the offer price and the first day closing price. 
Therefore, this research uses the Raw Initial Return formula; indeed, as reported by Gajewski 
and Gresse (2006, p.28), “considering that the market movements are too small to affect the 
initial returns significantly, most studies measure IPO underpricing with raw returns”. The raw 
initial return has been adopted by different authors: for example, Spindt, Fernando and 
Krishnamurthy (1999), Loughran and Ritter (2004) and Rajan and Servaes (2003) used the raw 
initial return formula in their models to study IPO underpricing.  
IPOs are underpriced when the initial return assumes a positive value, that is when the first day 
closing price is higher than the final offer price; while IPOs are overpriced when the initial 
return is negative. Finally, IPOs are correctly priced when the first day closing price is equal to 
the offer price.  
                                                          
21
 “Founding dates for 10,266 firms going public in the U.S. during 1975-2015” available at: 
https://site.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/files/2015/08/Founding-dates-for-10266-firms-going-public-in-the-US-
during-1975-2015-2015-07.pdf [Accessed 21 September 2017] 
22
 “IPO Underwriter Reputation Rankings (1980-2015)” available at: https://site.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipo-data/ 
[Accessed 21 September 2017] 
23
 The ranking goes from 0 (lowest quality) to 9 (highest quality). Underwriter rankings are calculated for the 
following periods: 1992-2000, 2001-2004, 2005-2007, 2008-2009, 2010-2011, 2012-2015. 
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To describe and analyse IPOs’ and firms’ characteristics, the following variables are taken into 
consideration: companies’ age, companies’ size (market capitalization is the proxy used for the 
size of the companies), the ratio of shares offered in the IPO, the period in which the IPO is 
conducted and the reputation of IPO underwriters. The age of the company at the time of the 
IPO is calculated as the difference (in years) between the date of the IPO and the date of 
incorporation of the company. The ratio of shares offered is calculated as shares offered in the 
IPO divided by total shares outstanding; while market capitalization is calculated as the product 
between the final offer price and the number of shares outstanding at the time of the IPO. 
Finally, underwriter reputation is measured using the Carter-Manaster rankings in which 
underwriters are ranked on a 0-9 scale, where the value 9 is assigned to the most prestigious 
and reputed underwriters. Table 2 summarizes the variables used in this research. 
VARIABLE EXPLANATION 
Initial Return (IPO first-day return) The IPO raw initial return: the % difference between the offer price and the first-day closing price 
Age of the Company The difference (in years) between the IPO date and the incorporation date 
Market Capitalization The product between the final offer price and the number of 
shares outstanding at the time of the IPO 
Ratio of Shares Offered Shares offered in the IPO divided by total shares outstanding 
Underwriter Reputation It is measured using the Carter-Manaster rankings in which 
underwriters are ranked on a 0-9 scale 
Period of the IPO 
The period in which the IPO is conducted: for example, “Dot-
com bubble” period (2000-2001) or the years of the financial 
crisis (2007-2009)  
Table 2 – List of Variables used in this research. (Source: own illustration)   
 
3.4 - DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS  
In the following paragraphs, it is performed the descriptive analysis of IPOs in the sample. The 
descriptive statistics reported, and the graphs presented, have the purpose of providing a 
summary of the data that can be useful to highlight the principal characteristics of internet-
related IPOs and the potential relationships between the level of underpricing and the other 
variables analysed. The analysis also illustrates which are the most important differences 
between the IPO of Facebook and the other internet IPOs; particularly, the differences in the 
level of initial return between Facebook’s IPO and the other sample IPOs comparable to 
Facebook’s one in terms of companies’ size, firms’ age (at the IPO) and period of the offerings. 
Indeed, I will compare the IPO of Facebook first with IPOs conducted by firms with similar 
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market capitalization, then with IPOs completed in the same period and, finally, with IPOs 
conducted by firms with similar age.  
 Underpriced Overpriced Correctly Priced Total 
Number of Companies 167 38 9 214 
% of the Total 78% 18% 4% 100% 
Mean Initial Return 44.03% -9.74% 0% 32.63% 
Median Initial Return 27.41% -7.28% 0% 18.42% 
Max/Min Value 353.85% -25.50% - - 
Table 3 - Descriptive Statistics of the Sample. (Source: own illustration based on sample data) 
As it is possible to note from Table 3, the internet-related IPOs included in the sample show an 
average underpricing of 32.63%. From the total number of companies included in the sample 
(214), 167 are underpriced (78% of the total IPOs), 38 are overpriced and only 9 are correctly 
priced. Since this sample includes almost all internet-related IPOs that went public between 
2000 and 2013 in US24, it is possible to conclude that nearly 80% of internet related IPOs 
conducted in this period were underpriced. Considering only pure underpriced IPOs, the 
average initial return increases to 44.03%; a really high level of underpricing that can be 
explained by the fact that companies in the sample all belong to tech and internet-related 
sectors: this result confirms Loughran and Ritter’s (2002) findings, who demonstrated that 
Internet IPOs are generally characterized by severe underpricing. Additionally, Table 3 reports 
that overpriced IPOs have an average negative initial return of 9.74%, and that the maximum 
and the minimum value of initial returns are respectively 353.85% and -25.50%. It is possible 
to note that the median of the initial return is smaller than the mean, meaning that the 
distribution of initial returns is skewed to the right, toward high values. More in details, to better 
analyse the distribution, it is useful to calculate its percentiles; Table 4 shows that 50% of total 
internet-related IPOs (the ones included between the 25th and the 75th percentile) have a positive 
initial return included between 0.35% and 48.66%. Moreover, as shown by the 5th and by the 
95th percentile, 5% of IPOs have a negative initial return lower than -12.89% and another 5% 
have an underpricing higher than 133.57%. For what regards overpriced IPOs, it is possible to 
observe that only 5% of IPOs have a negative initial return lower than -22.93%, while 50% of 
overpriced IPOs have a return included between -13.83% and -3.97%. Finally, considering 
underpriced IPOs, it is interesting to note that 25% of them (that means 42 IPOs) have an initial 
return higher that 59.73%. In Figure 4, it is reported the frequency distribution of IPO initial 
                                                          
24
 16 IPOs have been excluded from the total number of US internet related IPOs because data were not complete 
(see “Data and Data Sources”). 
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returns which, as expected, is skewed to the right; in Appendix A, it is also reported a Box Plot 
of IPO initial returns for all IPOs in the sample. 
Percentiles Underpriced Overpriced Total 
5th 0.43% -22.93% -12.89% 
25th 8.85% -13.83% 0.35% 
50th (Median) 27.41% -7.28% 18.42% 
75th 59.73% -3.97% 48.66% 
95th 135.90% -1.59% 133.57% 
Table 4 – Percentiles of IPO Initial Return Distribution. (Source: own illustration based on sample data) 
Table 5 reports some of the most important characteristics of the IPOs. The mean offer price 
for internet related IPOs in the sample is $14.59 and the mean market capitalization is almost 
$1.8 billion. Even for market capitalization, the median ($484 million) is substantially lower 
than the mean, because its distribution (shown in Figure 5) is skewed to the right and the mean 
is strongly influenced by relatively few extremely high values. Indeed, in the sample, there are 
some important internet related firms, like Facebook, Google, Twitter, Groupon, Youku.com 
and Corvis Corp., which, at the time of the IPO, had a market capitalization higher than $10 
billion and which increase the average market capitalization of the sample (these firms are all 
included in the last range of market capitalization, “>3500”, in Figure 5).   
                                                          
25
 In millions of US dollars. 
26
 In millions of US dollars. 
 Underpriced Overpriced Correctly Priced Total 
Mean Offer Price $15.32  $12.55 $9.67 $14.59 
Mean Market Capitalization25 $2,067 $801 $292 $1,767 
Median Market Capitalizat.26 $467 $504 $248 $484 
Mean Ratio (Shares Offered / 
Shares Outstanding) 26.35% 30.48% 19.28% 26.78% 
Table 5 – Descriptive Statistics of the Sample (Source: own illustration based on sample data) 
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Table 5 shows also that the mean ratio of shares offered to total shares outstanding is 26.78%, 
meaning that, on average, internet related firms offered almost 27% of their total shares to the 
public through the IPO. This percentage is slightly lower for only underpriced IPOs, while it 
increases to more than 30% for overpriced ones. Additionally, Figure 6 shows the relation 
between the ratio of shares offered and the level of initial return for underpriced IPOs. IPOs are 
classified into different groups based on their initial returns (“0%-10%”, “10%-20%” and so 
on); for each group of IPOs it is calculated the mean initial return and the mean ratio of shares 
offered and the results are graphically represented in Figure 6.  
Looking at the graph, it is possible to note that there seems to be a negative relation between 
IPO initial return and the ratio of shares offered: this is consistent with Grinblatt and Hwang 
(1989), who showed that there is a positive relationship between the retention rate and IPO 
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initial returns (that is to say that there is a negative relationship between the ratio of shares 
offered to shares outstanding and IPO initial returns) and that the decision to retain part of the 
shares issued is used by pre-IPO owners and managers to signal their optimism about firm’s 
future prospects and value.  
From Table 5, it is also possible to observe that there are relevant differences between 
underpriced, overpriced and correctly priced IPOs for what regards the average offer price and 
the average market capitalization at the time of listing. Indeed, the mean offer prices are $15.32, 
$12.55 and $9.67 respectively for underpriced, overpriced and correctly priced IPOs. The 
differences are even bigger for the average market capitalization: more than $2,067 million for 
underpriced IPOs, about $800 million for overpriced IPOs and only $292 million for correctly 
priced IPOs.  
Moreover, I analysed how the level of initial return varies with firms’ market capitalization (at 
the IPO). Table 6 reports six different ranges of market capitalization and the related mean 
initial return for the firms in sample; the same data are also graphically presented in Figure 7.  
Table 6 - Mean Initial Return for Different Range of Market Capitalization.  
(Source: own illustration based on sample data) 
 
Range of 
Market Cap. 
<250 
million 
250 – 500 
million 
0,5 – 1 
billion 
1 – 2  
Billion 
2 – 4 
Billion 
>4  
Billion 
Number of 
Companies 56 60 49 20 21 8 
Mean Market 
Capitalization 
$153 
million 
$360 
million 
$723 
million 
$1.29 
billion 
$2.6  
Billion 
$29  
Billion 
Mean Initial 
Return 18.05% 28.50% 38.98% 31.05% 62.15% 53.16% 
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It is possible to note that firms with a market capitalization in the ranges “2-4 billion” and “>4 
billion” have a mean initial return significantly higher than firms in the other ranges. 
Nevertheless only 29 companies have a market capitalization higher than $2 billion (21 
companies are in the range “2-4 billion” and only 8 are in the range “>4 billion”), while most 
companies have a market capitalization lower than $1 billion (about the 77% of the total 
sample). The range “250-500 million” includes the highest number of firms (60) and has a 
related mean initial return of 28.50%. Firms included in the first range of market capitalization 
(“<250 million”) have the lowest mean level of initial return (18.05%), while firms in the range 
“2-4 billion” have the highest one (62.15%). 
As it can be observed in Figure 827, the sample firm with the highest market capitalization is 
Facebook. In the sample, only 7 companies (which means, the 3.3% of all companies analysed) 
have a market capitalization higher than $10 billion but none of them is similar in size (market 
capitalization) to Facebook: indeed, Facebook’s market capitalization ($104 billion) is more 
than four times Google’s market capitalization (about $23 billion), which is the second highest 
value. So, when the IPO of Facebook is compared to the IPOs of the other biggest companies 
in the sample (in terms of company’s market capitalization), it must be considered the fact that 
the market capitalization of Facebook is much higher than that of all the other internet firms 
(and it can be considered an outlier value). 
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 Figure 8 is a Scatter Plot which shows Market Capitalization and Initial Return for firms with a market 
capitalization higher than $2 billion. In Appendix A, it is reported the same Scatter Plot for all sample firms. 
Figure 8 – Scatter Plot which shows Market Capitalization and Initial Return (for firms with a 
market capitalization higher than $2 billion). (Source: own illustration based on sample data) 
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Considering only firms with a market capitalization higher than $10 billion, it is possible to 
note from Table 7 that there are relevant differences between the IPO of Facebook and all the 
other IPOs, for what regards the initial return, the ratio of shares offered and the offer price.  
Firms with Market 
Capitalization >10 billion 
Initial Return 
(Mean) 
Initial Return 
(Median) 
Offer Price 
(Mean) 
Ratio Shares 
Offered (Mean) 
FACEBOOK IPO 0.61% - $38.00 19.70% 
All Other IPOs 
(Excluding Facebook) 61.29% 51.62% $32.55 6.04% 
Table 7 – Descriptive Statistics for only Firms with Market Capitalization “>10 billion”.  
(Source: own illustration based on sample data) 
Facebook’s IPO is characterized by an initial positive return of 0.61%: it is the lowest initial 
return for the IPOs of firms with a market capitalization higher than $10 billion. The mean and 
the median initial return for the other IPOs are respectively 61.29% and 51.62%. Among the 
companies with a market capitalization higher than $10 billion, there are also Facebook’s 
competitors, Google and Twitter, whose IPOs are characterized by an initial underpricing of, 
respectively, 18.04% and 72.69%. So, despite the internet firms with a market capitalization 
higher than $10 billion are characterized by an extremely high average level of underpricing 
and despite the IPO initial return seems to increase, on average, with the increase in firms’ 
market capitalization, Facebook (which is the firm with the highest market capitalization in the 
sample) has an IPO first-day return of only 0.61%. 
The most relevant difference between Facebook’s IPO and other IPOs with a market 
capitalization higher than $10 billion is related to the level of initial return: Facebook’s IPO 
significantly underperform with respect to other IPOs and to the IPOs of its competitors. 
Additionally, from Table 5, it is possible to observe that the ratio of shares offered in Facebook 
IPO (19.70%) is more than three times the mean ratio of other IPOs (6.04%) and the offer price 
at $38 is more than 16% higher than the mean offer price ($32.55) of other IPOs.  
Furthermore, I also analysed how the level of underpricing varies in the period 2000-2013. 
Figure 9 shows that the level of initial return is not constant: it reaches its highest value in the 
years 2000-2001, and its lowest value in the years 2008-2009 (in Appendix A, it is reported a 
scatter plot which shows the distribution of IPO initial return in different years). The same trend 
can be also observed for the volume of IPOs: the highest number of IPOs is in the years 2000-
2001, while the lowest one is in the years 2008-2009. This is coherent with Sindelar, Ritter and 
Ibbotson’s (1994) findings, who showed that both IPO volume and the degree of underpricing 
are cyclical, and that there are periods characterised by high average initial returns and an 
unusually high volume of offerings (which are known as “hot issue” markets) and periods 
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characterised by low degree of underpricing and low issuing volume (which are known as 
“cold” market). 
In Table 8, internet-related IPOs are divided and aggregated by periods of years (“2000-2001”, 
“2002-2006”, “2007-2009”, “2010-2013”). This division is made to highlight the levels of 
underpricing in particular periods of time characterized by the presence the “Dot-com bubble” 
(2000-2001) and by the presence of the financial crisis (2007-2009).  
Years N° IPOs (Total) 
N° IPOs 
per Year 
(Mean) 
N° IPOs 
(Underpriced) 
Percentage 
Underpriced 
IPOs 
Mean Initial 
Return 
Variance 
Initial 
Return 
2000-2001 59 30 47 79.66% 50.97% 44.15% 
2002-2006 61 12 48 78.69% 21.90% 23.41% 
2007-2009 27 9 20 74.07% 19.20% 7.18% 
2010-2013 67 17 52 77.61% 31.65% 14.01% 
Table 8 - IPOs divided by Periods of Years. (Source: own illustration based on sample data) 
The period 2000-2001 is characterized by the presence of the so called “Dot-com Bubble” 
which started in 1997, reached its peak in the first part of 2000 and then collapsed in 2002. 
These years are characterized by many IPOs of internet-related companies (about 30 IPOs per 
year), which are subject to excessive speculation. The table shows that the mean initial return 
in this period for internet-related IPOs in our sample is almost 51%, much higher than the other 
periods considered. In the years 2000-2001, both the number of IPOs per year and the variance 
of initial return are the highest of the periods taken into consideration. As it is possible to expect, 
the lowest average level of IPO underpricing (19.20%) and the lowest number of IPOs per year 
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Figure 9 – Mean Level of Initial Returns and Volume of IPOs in different years.  
(Source: own illustration based on sample data) 
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(only 9) occur in the period 2007-2009, the years in which the financial crisis developed and 
strongly hit stock markets. Finally, the periods from 2002 to 2006 and from 2010 to 2013 
present, respectively, an average underpricing of 21.90% and 31.65% and an average number 
of IPOs per year of 12 and 17. It is also interesting to note that there are no relevant differences 
in the percentage of underpriced IPOs (on the total IPOs) in the different periods, and that the 
percentage is between 74% (in the years 2007-2009) and 80% (in the years 2000-2001).  
Facebook went public in 2012, in a period characterized by several successful internet-related 
IPOs. As it is possible to observe from Figure 9, the years 2012-2013 are characterized by the 
second highest average initial return and by the second highest volume of IPOs, after the ones 
of the “Dot-com bubble” period. So, excluding the years of the internet bubble (2000-2001), 
the period in which Facebook IPO was conducted is characterized by the highest levels of 
underpricing for internet-related IPOs.  
In the period 2011-2013, several important internet companies and Facebook’s competitors 
went public: Facebook’s first day return (0.61%) is not only much lower than the average initial 
return of the total IPOs in the period 2010-2013 (31.65%28), but also, as shown by Figure 10, it 
is not in line with the performance of the most important internet IPOs conducted in the same 
years. Facebook’s competitors, LinkedIn and Twitter, which went public in 2011 and 2013, 
realized extremely high IPO initial returns (109.44% and 72.69%). Additionally, Yandex N.V. 
and Groupon, the firms with the highest market capitalization after Facebook and Twitter (in 
the period 2011-2013), were characterized by an IPO underpricing of 55.36% and 30.55%.  
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 See Table 8. 
Figure 10 – Initial return for some of the most important internet-related IPOs of the period 2011-2013.  
(Source: own illustration based on sample data) 
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It is also important to analyse the age of the companies at the time of the IPO and how the level 
of underpricing varies with it, because generally, as showed by Ritter (1991), there is a negative 
relation between firm’s age (at the time of going public) and the level of underpricing. Then, I 
analysed the age of sample internet firms and their relationship with IPO initial return to verify 
whether the firm’s age at the time of the IPO influence the level of underpricing also for internet 
IPOs. 
Table 9 shows that the mean age of internet-related companies is 8.43 years, while the median 
is 7 years. There are no relevant differences between the mean age of underpriced, overpriced 
and correctly priced IPOs. As shown by Figure 11, the vast majority of firms going public are 
less than 15 years old (about 92% of total companies); more in detail: 31.8% are companies 
with less than 5 years old, 43.9% are companies with an age between 6 and 10 years, 16.8% are 
companies with an age between 11 and 15 years, and only 7.5% are companies with more than 
15 years old. 
In Table 10, IPOs are segmented by age of the companies at the time of the listing.  All the 
IPOs are divided in three categories: the first category includes IPOs conducted by firms with 
5 years old or less, the second category includes IPOs conducted by firms with an age between 
6 and 10 years, the third category includes IPOs conducted by firms with more than 10 years 
old. It is possible to observe that there are important differences between the three categories. 
The youngest firms (belonging to the first category) show a mean initial return of 46.28%, 
which is much higher than the 27.80% and the 23.49% of the second and third category. IPOs 
 Underpriced Overpriced Correctly Priced Total 
Mean Company Age 8.53 7.87 8.78 8.43 
Median Company Age 7.00 7.00 9 7.00 
Table 9 – Mean and Median Company Age at the Time of the IPO. (Source: own illustration based on sample data) 
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Figure 11 - Frequency Distribution of the Age of Issuing Firms. (Source: own illustration based on sample data) 
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of young firms (5 or less years old) also exhibit the maximum and the minimum initial return 
of the total IPOs in the sample and the greatest difference between the mean and the median 
value (in all the categories the mean value of initial return is higher than the median value). 
These results are consistent with Ritter’s (1991) findings, who demonstrated that there is a 
negative relation between firm’s age (at the time of going public) and the level of underpricing, 
and explained that younger firms are generally associated with higher risks and greater ex-ante 
uncertainty, and that ex-ante uncertainty is positively related to IPO underpricing. 
From Table 10, it can be also noted that the percentage of underpriced issues with respect to 
the total issues is nearly the same in the 3 age categories and that it is slightly lower than 80%.  
Table 10 - IPOs divided by Age. (Source: own illustration based on sample data) 
Figure 12 represents the data reported in Table 10. From the graph, it is possible to observe how 
the age of the firms at the time of the IPO influences the level of underpricing for the companies 
in the sample: the youngest internet-related firms (“Age 0-5”) are characterized by the highest 
mean level of underpricing (46.28%, that increases to 60.81% if only underpriced IPOs are 
considered), while the oldest ones (“Age >10”) are characterized by the lowest level (23.49%). 
Moreover, it is possible to observe that the highest number of IPOs is conducted by issuing 
firms in the age category “6-10” years, while the lowest number of IPOs is conducted by firms 
with more than 10 years. 
Age 
(Range) 
N° IPOs 
(Total) 
N° IPOs 
(Underpriced) 
Percentage 
Underpriced 
IPOs 
Mean 
Initial 
Return 
Median 
Initial 
Return 
Maximum 
Initial 
Return 
Minimum 
Initial 
Return 
0 – 5 68 54 79.41% 46.28% 19.63% 353.85% -25.50% 
6 – 10 94 72 76.59% 27.80% 22.36% 168.73% -22.56% 
>10 52 41 78.84% 23.49% 11.97% 189.06% -21.50% 
Figure 12 - Average Initial Returns and IPOs divided by Age. (Source: own illustration based on sample data) 
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Considering only internet firms with a market capitalization higher than $10 billion, the average 
companies’ age at the IPO is 5.29 years, that it is lower than the mean age of total firms in the 
sample (8.43 years). Nevertheless, firms with a market capitalization higher than $10 billion 
are only 7 in the sample and their mean age is lowered by the values of Groupon’s and Corvis 
Corporation’s IPOs: indeed, the age range for firms with a market capitalization higher than 10 
billion goes from 3 years (the age of Groupon and Corvis Corp. at the time of the IPO) to 8 
years (the age of Facebook at the time of the IPO). As it is possible to note from Table 11, the 
age of Facebook at the IPO is in line with the age of its competitors; Facebook, Twitter, 
LinkedIn and Google are all included in the category “6-10” years (the age category that 
contains more than 43% of the total companies in the sample).   
 
 Firms with Market 
Capitalization >10 
billion (Mean) 
Facebook Groupon  Google Twitter  LinkedIn29 
Age 
(Years) 5.29 8 3 6 7 9 
Table 11 – Age at the time of the IPO for firms with Market Capitalization higher than 10 billion.  
(Source: own illustration based on sample data) 
Finally, Table 12 and Figure 13 show the mean and the frequency distribution of underwriters’ 
ranks for IPOs in the sample. The mean underwriter rank is 8.44 and it is, on average, slightly 
higher for underpriced IPOs (8.52) than for overpriced ones (8.08). About 70% of IPOs are 
marketed by underwriters that have rank 9 (73.05% of underpriced IPOs and 63.16% of 
overpriced), while only 11.7% of all IPOs are marketed by underwriters with rank inferior to 8. 
Consequently, assuming that most prestigious and reputed underwriters have a rank equal or 
higher than 8, more than 88% of all IPOs in the sample are marketed by the most prestigious 
investment banks. The most important internet-related IPOs and all the firms with a market 
capitalization higher than $2 billion (including Facebook’s IPO) are marketed by underwriters 
that have rank 9, which are: Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs, J.P. Morgan, Citigroup, Credit 
Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Bank of America – Merrill Lynch and Salomon Smith Barney.  
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 LinkedIn’s market capitalization at the time of the IPO is lower than 10 billion, but it is included in Table 11 
because it is one of the most important Facebook’s competitors. 
 Underpriced Overpriced Correctly Priced Total 
Mean Underwriter Rank 8.52 8.08 8.39 8.44 
% Underwriter with Rank = 9  73.05% 63.16% 55.56% 70.09% 
Table 12 - Underwriter Rank. (Source: own illustration based on sample data) 
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3.5 - RESULTS 
From the descriptive analysis, it has been observed that internet-related IPOs conducted in the 
period between 2000 and 2013 have, on average, high levels of initial return and that almost 
80% of the total IPOs are underpriced: 167 on the total 214 internet IPOs analysed are 
underpriced and the average level of underpricing is 32.63% (the median underpricing is 
18.42%, meaning that initial returns have a positively skewed distribution). Considering that 
the average underpricing for U.S. IPOs in the period 2001-2016 is 14%30, it is possible to 
conclude that internet firms are generally characterized by high levels of underpricing. 
The analysis shows that initial returns are, on average, substantially higher for younger firms 
and decrease with the increase in the firms’ age. The issuing firms of the sample have an average 
and median age (at the time of their IPO) of, respectively, 8.43 years and 7 years: 31.8% are 
companies with less than 5 years old, 43.9% are companies with an age between 6 and 10 years, 
and 24.3% are companies with less than 10 years old. It has been noted that youngest firms 
have the highest mean level of initial returns and oldest firms the lowest level: the mean initial 
return is 46.28% for companies with less than 5 years old, 27.80% for companies with an age 
between 6 to 10 years and 23.49% for companies with more than 10 years old. Additionally, it 
has also been observed that the average level of initial return and the volume of internet-related 
IPOs change over time: as expected, both the initial return and the volume of IPOs reach their 
highest levels during the years 2000-2001 (characterized by the presence of the “Dot-com 
Bubble”) and their lowest levels during the financial crisis of 2007-2009. The average initial 
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 Source: “IPO Statistics for 2016 and Earlier Years” Ritter, J.R. (2017); available on available on Jay R. Ritter’s 
website. See: https://site.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipo-data/ [Accessed 7 November 2017] 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 8,5 9
Fr
eq
u
en
cy
Underwriter Rank
Figure 13 – Frequency Distribution of Underwriter Rank. (Source: own illustration based on sample data) 
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return for internet IPOs in the sample is 50.97% in the years 2000-2001, 21.90% in the years 
2002-2006, 19.29% in the years 2007-2009 and 31.65% in the years 2010-2013.  
These results are consistent with the findings of Loughran and Ritter (2002), Ljungqvist and 
Wilhelm (2003), Lowry and Schwert (2002), and Lowry, Officer and Schwert (2010). They 
demonstrated that internet related firms (together with high-tech firms) and younger companies 
are generally characterized by severe underpricing and that the highest levels of underpricing 
occurred during the Internet bubble: Loughran and Ritter (2002) and Ljungqvist and Wilhelm 
(2003) showed that the years 1999-2001 were characterized by average levels of underpricing 
higher than 50% for tech and internet related firms and Lowry, Officer and Schwert (2010) 
added that those years were characterized not only by the highest level of underpricing but also 
by the highest volatility of IPO initial returns. The analysis is also consistent with Sindelar, 
Ritter and Ibbotson’s (1994) findings, who demonstrated that both IPO volume and the degree 
of underpricing are cyclical and vary over time and with Ritter’s (1991) findings, who showed 
that there is a negative relation between firm’s age and the level of initial underpricing.  
The descriptive analysis performed shows also that most companies in the sample have a market 
capitalization lower than $1 billion (about 77% of total issuing firms), but that the companies 
with a market capitalization included in the range “2-4 billion” and “>4 billion” have the highest 
mean levels of initial return: issuing firms with a market capitalization lower than $250 million 
have the lowest mean of initial return (18.05%), while firms with a market capitalization 
between $2 and $4 billion have the highest one (62.15%). Moreover, it has been noted that 
underpriced IPOs are characterized by a lower ratio of shares offered compared to overpriced 
IPOs, and that there seems to be a negative relation between the level of initial return and the 
ratio of shares offered by issuing firms. Finally, the analysis reports that more than 88% of all 
internet IPOs of the sample (and all internet IPOs with a market capitalization higher than $2 
billion) are marketed by the most prestigious and reputed underwriters. 
Considering Facebook’s IPO, the analysis shows that it is characterized by a positive first-day 
return of only 0.61%, much lower than the sample mean level of underpricing (32.63%). In 
terms of firm’s market capitalization (at the time of the IPO), Facebook is the biggest internet 
companies in the analysed period and the underperformance of Facebook’s IPO is particularly 
evident with respect to the IPOs of the other biggest companies in the sample. Indeed, 
considering all the IPOs of firms with a market capitalization higher than $10 billion, Facebook 
IPO has the lowest initial return: the other most market capitalized companies (the ones with a 
market capitalization higher than $10 billion) are characterized by an extremely high average 
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level of underpricing (61.29%). Facebook’s IPO performance is also not in line with the IPOs 
performance of its competitors, in particular with LinkedIn’s and Twitter’s IPOs that are 
characterized by an initial return of 109.44% and 72.69%.  
From the descriptive analysis performed, it is not possible to understand the factors that caused 
the abnormal performance of Facebook’s IPO. The period in which Facebook’s IPO is launched 
is the period with the highest average level of underpricing after the “Dot-com bubble period”, 
and it is characterized by several successful large internet-related IPOs (as it shown in Figure 
10). Moreover, the age of Facebook at the time of the offering is line both with the mean age 
of internet firms in the sample and with the age of its competitors; additionally, Facebook’s IPO 
is marketed by the most prestigious and reputed underwriters like all the other major IPOs. 
The most important differences that the analysis highlights between Facebook and the other 
highly market capitalized firms are related to the ratio of shares offered in the IPO and to the 
level of market capitalization: the ratio of shares offered in Facebook’s IPO is more than three 
times the mean ratio of the other IPOs and Facebook’s market capitalization is more than four 
times Google’s one, that is the second highest market capitalization of the sample. The 
extremely high market capitalization at the IPO is based on the final offer price set by 
underwriters and so on the implied valuation accorded to Facebook at the IPO; while the high 
ratio of shares offered is due to the strong insider selling of pre-IPO owners and managers in 
Facebook’s offering.  
In Chapter 4, it is described all the Facebook’s IPO process, the stock market debut and the 
short-term negative stock performance. Particularly, it is analysed if the abnormal performance 
of the offering is caused by the offer price set by underwriters and so by the valuation of the 
company at the IPO. In next chapter, different elements and factors are analysed to study the 
Facebook case: only considering the unique characteristics and problems of Facebook’s IPO it 
is possible to explain its negative performance. 
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CHAPTER 4 – THE FACEBOOK IPO CASE 
 
4.1 - INTRODUCTION  
The analysis presented in the previous chapter shows that almost 80% of IPOs in the sample 
are underpriced and that internet-related IPOs are, on average, characterized by high levels of 
underpricing. Considering the most important internet-related IPOs conducted in the period 
2000-2013, it is possible to note that most of them had extremely high positive initial returns: 
for example, LinkedIn’s shares gained more than 100% on their first day of trading, Twitter’s 
shares jumped up by almost 73%, Yandex N.V.’s shares and Groupon’s shares realized a gain 
of, respectively, more than 55% and more than 30%. Nevertheless, the biggest31, most hyped 
and most anticipated Internet related IPO of this period, that is Facebook IPO, was not 
characterized by high initial returns: Facebook’s shares were not underpriced and realized a 
negative performance in the first months after the stock market debut. The initial weak stock 
performance disappointed investors, which were expecting a short-term stock price increase: 
indeed, at the time of the listing, Facebook was “the most popular internet service in the world” 
(Lai and Wu, 2014, p.2) and its IPO received a lot of attention during the road show and created 
enthusiasm among investors. Facebook went public on May 18, 2012 and was listed on 
NASDAQ at an offer price of $38 per share; the IPO raised about $16 billion and valued the 
company more than $100 billion. Facebook’s shares closed the first day of trading at $38.23 (in 
line with the offer price), the next day they closed at $34.03 and then at $31.00 after three days 
of trading. On August 31, the closing price was $18.06, meaning that shares had fallen by more 
than 50% in three months. As it is possible to observe from Figure 14, the stock price trend did 
not reflect the positive expectations that had been created during marketing activities and a lot 
of problems and controversies arose in the days following the IPO. The initial public offering 
of Facebook is today considered by some authors “the most important failed IPO in the history 
of American capital markets”. (Diamond, 2012, p.2).  
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 Today, Facebook IPO is the second largest Internet related IPOs of all time; Alibaba IPO, which raised $25 
billion, became the largest IPO in 2014. 
Figure 14 – Facebook Stock Chart. The first five months after the IPO. (Source: amigobulls.com) 
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This chapter reports and analyses the reasons of the negative stock performance after the 
Facebook’s initial public offering. Different causes are taken into consideration to explain the 
failure of the IPO: the reason of the offering, the final price set by the underwriter, the valuations 
made by analysts, the number of shares offered, the portion of shares sold by pre-IPO owners 
and the ownership structure after the IPO. Particularly, I will estimate the value of the company 
at the time of the IPO and compare it to the value implied by the IPO offer price, in order to 
determine whether the company was overvalued or correctly priced. 
In the following paragraphs, it is firstly analysed the business and the economic performance 
of Facebook before the IPO; then it is described the IPO process and the problems arisen the 
last days before the offering. In the second part of the chapter, it is reported the valuation of the 
company performed using DCF methodology. Finally, it is discussed the causes of Facebook’s 
IPO failure and the reasons of the short-term bad stock performance. 
 
4.2 - FACEBOOK BEFORE THE IPO 
Facebook Inc. is an American company which offers social networking services, and which 
owns the social media platform “Facebook”. Facebook website (the original name was 
TheFacebook.com) was founded on February 4, 2004 by Mark Zuckerberg and other four 
Harvard college students and it is today based in Menlo Park (California). Facebook’s mission, 
as reported in the company’s website and in the Registration Statement, is “to make the world 
more open and connected” and “to give people the power to build community and bring the 
world closer together. People use Facebook to stay connected with friends and family, to 
discover what’s going on in the world, and to share and express what matters to them”.  
As it is possible to note from Figure 15, Facebook had 360 million of Monthly Active Users 
worldwide (MAUs) at the end of 2009, 608 million MAUs at the end of 2010 and 845 million 
MAUs at the end of 2011, which means that monthly active users increased of about 69% and 
39% in the two years before the IPO. Considering Daily Active users, the growth was even 
stronger: Facebook had 185 million of Daily Active Users worldwide (DAUs) at the end of 
2009, 327 million DAUs at the end of 2010 and 483 million DAUs at the end of 2011, meaning 
a growth of 77% and 48% respectively in 2010 and 2011. Additionally, as reported in the 
prospectus of the Registration Statement, at the end of 2011, Facebook had more than 425 
million MAUs who used Facebook mobile products; all the users generated an average of 2.7 
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billion Likes and Comments per day and, on average, more than 250 million photos per day 
were uploaded on the social network. 
Since the half of 2007, Facebook has been one of the ten most visited websites in the world 
and, since 2008, when Facebook surpassed Myspace, it has been also the most popular social 
networks. As shown in Figure 16, in 2011, Facebook had a US market share32 in the segment 
of social-networking sites of almost 65%, more than three times higher than YouTube’s market 
share. Twitter, one of the closest Facebook’s competitors (considering the services and the 
functions offered by the two social networks), had a market share of 1.4%; while LinkedIn had 
a market share of only 0.6%. Google+, which was launched in June 2011, had a market shares 
lower than 0.5% (in the graph, Google+’s market share is included in the category “Other”). 
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 Market shares is based on the number of social networks’ visits. 
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Facebook Financial Results  
Facebook reported revenue of $3,711 million in 2011, with an increase of 88% over 2010 
revenue of $1,974 million. Facebook 2011 revenue were almost five times its 2009 revenue 
($777 million) and nearly fourteen times its 2008 revenue ($272 million)33. As shown by Table 
13, all the revenues were generated from advertising and from fees associated with Facebook 
Online Payments Infrastructure, which enables users to purchase virtual and digital goods from 
the Platform: advertising accounted for 98%, 95% and 85% of Facebook revenue respectively 
in 2009, 2010, 2011. Advertising revenues increased by 145% in 2010, and by 69% in 2011; 
while payments and other fees revenues increased from $13 million in 2009 to $557 million in 
2011.  
The 2011 revenue increase was primarily due to the growth of advertising revenue which grew 
thanks to a “42% increase in the number of ads delivered and an 18% increase in the average 
price per ad delivered” (Facebook’s Registration Statement, February 2012, p.50) and to the 
strong growth of fees generated by Facebook Payments Infrastructure, that started to generate 
significant revenue in 2011 because “Facebook Payments became mandatory for all game 
developers accepting payments on the Facebook Platform” (Facebook’s Registration 
Statement, February 2012, p.50).  
About 56% of total 2011 revenue were generated in United States, but this percentage was 
decreasing (it was 67% in 2009 and 62% in 2010) because revenues generated in Western 
Europe, Canada and Australia had started to grow rapidly thanks to the fast expansion of 
international users. Moreover, 12% of 2011 revenue and almost 10% of 2010 revenue came 
from a single costumer, the game-maker Zynga: this revenue consisted of direct advertising 
purchased by Zynga and of payments processing fees related to the sales of virtual goods 
(Facebook Payments was the primary means of payments used by Zynga’s games). 
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 See Appendix B: “Consolidated Income Statement from 2007 to 2011”. 
Revenue 2009 2010 2011 
% Change 
2009 to 2010 
% Change 
2010 to 2011 
Total Revenue $ 777 $ 1,974 $ 3,711 154% 88% 
Advertising Revenue 
% on Total Revenue 
$ 764 
98% 
$ 1,868 
95% 
$ 3,154 
85% 
145% 69% 
Payments and Other Fees  
% on Total Revenue 
$ 13 
2% 
$ 106 
5% 
$ 557 
15% 
NM 425% 
Table 13 – Facebook’s Revenue 2009-2011. Data in millions of US Dollars. (Source: own illustration based 
on Facebook’s Registration Statement, February 2012) 
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At the end of 2011, operating income was $1,756 million (increased by 70% over 2010), net 
income was $1,000 million (increased by 65% over 2010) and the company had a healthy 27% 
of net profit margin. This was the third year of positive net income (as it possible to note from 
Figure 17): indeed, until 2008 the company was making losses and it became profitable in 2009 
with a net income of $229 million34.  
Facebook net income growth was smaller (65% in 2011) compared to revenue growth (88% in 
2011) due to the strong increase of costs and expenses incurred: cost of revenue (costs related 
to the expansion of Facebook data centre operations) increased of 74%, marketing and sales of 
132%, research and development of 169% and, finally, general and administrative expenses 
increased of 131%. Particularly, research and development costs grew from $87 million in 2009 
to $388 million in 2011 (more than 10% of total 2011 revenue): R&D expenses included 
investments sustained to improve existing products and create new ones. As stated in the 
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 See Appendix B: “Consolidated Income Statement from 2007 to 2011”. 
Consolidated Income Statement 2009 2010 2011 
Revenue $ 777 $ 1,974 $ 3,711 
Cost of Revenue $ 223 $ 493 $ 860 
Marketing and Sales $ 115 $ 184 $ 427 
Research and Development $ 87 $ 144 $ 388 
General and Administrative $ 90 $ 121 $ 280 
Total Costs and Expenses $ 515 $ 942 $ 1,955 
Income (Loss) from Operations $ 262 $ 1,032 $ 1,756 
Other Expenses $ 8 $ 24 $ 61 
Provision for Income Taxes $ 25 $ 402 $ 695 
Net Income $ 229 $ 606 $ 1,000 
Table 14 - Consolidated Income Statement. Data in millions of US Dollars. (Source: own illustration based on Facebook’s 
Registration Statement, February 2012)  
Figure 17 – Facebook’s Revenue and Net Profit from 2007 to 2011. Data in millions of US Dollars.  
(Source: own illustration based on Facebook’s Registration Statement, February 2012) 
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prospectus of Facebook’s IPO, all these costs were expected to further increase both in the 
dollar amount and as a percentage of revenue to support user growth and enhance user 
engagement.  
As reported in the consolidated balance sheet at 31 December 201135, company’s total assets 
increased from $2,990 in 2010 million to $6,331 million in 2011, thanks to the increase in cash 
equivalents and marketable securities (which reflected the increase in the cash generated by 
operations) and to the increase in property and equipment. Cash used in investing activities was 
primarily related to the purchase of property and equipment which were essential to support the 
expansion of the business: the amount of property and equipment reported in the consolidated 
balance sheet of 2011 was ten times higher the amount reported in the consolidated balance 
sheet of 2009 ($148 million36). Facebook principal commitments were related to capital lease 
obligations (which increased during 2011, in line with the increase of property and equipment), 
used to finance property and equipment and data centre facilities; while there were no other 
long-term debts (long-term debts were $ 250 million at the end of 2010, but they were all repaid 
during the first half of 2011). Facebook principal sources of liquidity were cash and cash 
equivalents, marketable securities and cash generated from operations; as stated in the 
company’s IPO prospectus, at the end of 2011, Facebook had available funds and cash flows 
from operations sufficient to meet its operational cash needs for the foreseeable future. Finally, 
the increase in stockholders’ equity reported in the 2011 balance sheet was primarily due to the 
                                                          
35
 See Appendix B for the detailed “Consolidated Balance Sheet” reported in Facebook’s Registration Statement 
(February 2012). 
36
 See Appendix B: Consolidated Balance Sheet Data (2007-2011). 
ASSETS  2010 2011 LIABILITIES AND EQUITY 2010 2011 
Total Current Assets $ 2,246 $ 4,604 Total Current Liabilities $ 2,246 $ 4,604 
Cash and Cash Equivalents $ 1,785 $ 1,512 Accounts Payable $ 29 $ 63 
Marketable Securities - $ 2,396 Platform Partners Payable $ 75 $ 171 
Accounts Receivable $ 373 $ 547 Current Capital Lease obligat. $ 106 $ 279 
Prepaid Expenses  $ 88 $ 149 Other Current Liabilities $ 179 $ 386 
      
Property and Equipment $ 574 $ 1,475 Capital Lease Obligations $ 117 $ 398 
Goodwill and Intangible  $ 96 $ 162 Long Term Debt $ 250 - 
Other Assets  $ 74 $ 90 Total Liabilities $ 72 $ 135 
   Stockholders’ Equity $ 2,162 $ 4,899 
Total Assets $ 2,990 $ 6,331 Total Liabilities and Equity $ 2,990 $ 6,331 
Table 15 - Consolidated Balance Sheet. Data in millions of US Dollars. (Source: own illustration based on 
Facebook’s Registration Statement, February 2012)  
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increase in “Retained earnings” (that increased of $1,000 million, since the full amount of 2011 
net income was added to the previous retained earnings) and to the increase in “Additional paid-
in capital”.  
 
Opportunities, Strategies and Risk Factors 
As reported in the prospectus of Facebook’s IPO, total worldwide advertising spending in 2010 
was $588 billion, while online advertising spending was forecasted to increase from $68 billion 
in 2010 to $120 billion in 2015. As it is possible to note from Figure 18, “online” advertising 
(also called “internet” advertising) was the third most used advertising media after “television” 
and “newspapers”. Additionally, considering total worldwide spending in the period between 
2007 and 2011, Figure 18 shows that “internet” advertising was rapidly acquiring market shares 
at the expense of the other advertising media. Indeed, “internet” advertising’s market share 
increased from 8.5% in 2007 to more than 15% in 2011 while, except “Television” advertising 
which had a market share quite stable (37% in 2007 that increased to 39% in 2009), all the other 
most used advertising media lost market share: “newspapers” advertising’s market share 
decreased from 27% in 2007 to 21% in 2011, “magazines” advertising’s market share passed 
from more than 12% to less than 10% in the same period and, finally, “radio” advertising’s 
market share passed from 8% to 7%. Given the increasing diffusion of internet worldwide, it 
was possible to expect that internet advertising would have continued to acquire importance 
and market share in the following years: since Facebook revenue came mostly from online 
advertising, the growth of this sector represented an important opportunity also for the growth 
of the company.  
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
Television Newspapers Internet Magazines Radio Other
%
 o
f M
a
rk
et
 
Sh
a
re
Types of Advertising Media
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Figure 18 – Worldwide Advertising Spending Share, By Media (Source: own illustration based on Digital Strategy 
Consulting and ZenithOptimedia) 
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From Table 16, it is possible to observe that Facebook in 2011 was the third company by market 
share in the US online advertising market. Particularly, it can be noted that its 2011 market 
share (7.7%) was more than three times higher its 2009 market share (2.4%); in the same years, 
Yahoo’s market share decreased from 16.1% to 11.9%, while Google’s market share increased 
from 34.9% to 43.5%. In 2011, Google was by far the leader of US online advertising market, 
but it was also the world’s leading search engine and it had more than 66%37 of total US search 
engine traffic.  
 
 
 
 
Facebook’s market share was increasing (on the online advertising market) thanks, above all, 
to the success of the advertising on the social network: Facebook offered the possibility to 
accurately target the audience of each advertisements using all the different information 
collected by the social network (like demographic information, interests, hobbies, connections, 
location etc.) and this was one the most relevant elements needed by all advertisers. Facebook 
created and offered advertising solutions “designed to be more engaging and relevant for users 
in order to help advertisers better achieve their goals” (Facebook’s Registration Statement, 
February 2012, p.78). Facebook had a significant market opportunity because advertising on 
the social web was still emerging and evolving; advertisers were still experimenting with the 
best ways to leverage the social network to create and spread valuable ads.  
Additionally, also Facebook Payment infrastructure had important growth opportunities 
because was employed only for the purchase of virtual goods used in social games: its use could 
be improved and extended to other kind of apps. The prospectus reported that the worldwide 
revenue generated from the sale of virtual goods were $2 billion in 2007, $7 billion in 2010 and 
were expected to increase to $15 billion by 2014. Facebook Payment started to generate relevant 
revenue in 2011, and it was important for Facebook to continue the development of the Payment 
Platform because, until 2010, Facebook depended on only advertising revenue. 
Facebook’s strategy was focused, first of all, on growing its costumer and user base across all 
markets (including the less-penetrated ones) by enhancing its products, investing in marketing 
and launching new mobile apps: Facebook developers prioritized investments in product 
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 Source: Experian Hitwise (2011) 
 2009 2010 2011 
Google 34.9% 38.9% 43.5% 
Yahoo 16.1% 13.4% 11.9% 
Facebook 2.4% 4.7% 7.7% 
Table 16 – Top 3 US Online Adv. Selling Companies, by Market Share (measured as % of Total 
US Online Adv. Revenue). (Source: own illustration based on eMarketer, 2011) 
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development with the aim of increasing user engagement and improving Facebook experience 
both on the website and on mobile devices. The social network was investing with the primary 
goal of expanding its global user community and rendering Facebook available to more people 
in the world. Figure 19 shows that Facebook was increasing its presence across all the 
continents: Facebook’s global penetration rate (measured as % of internet users) increased from 
24.5% at the end of 2010 to 31.6% at the end of 2011. More in details, Facebook’s penetration 
strongly increased in Latin America (from 30.8% to 48.0%), in Middle East & Africa (from 
30.9% to 46.2%), in Western Europe (from 31.7% to 40.3%) and in Eastern Europe (from 
25.5% to 31.1%); while in North America it passed from 52.6% to 57.3%. In Asia-Pacific 
region, penetration rate increased from 11.0% to 15.7%38; nevertheless, Facebook’s penetration 
in this region remained low because its usage was not allowed in China, due to the country’s 
ban on the social network.  
The other key element of the strategy regarded the improvement of ad products usable by 
advertisers: Facebook believed that social, relevant and well-integrated ad products could 
enhance user experience and, at the same time, provide significant returns for advertisers. 
Facebook offered different advertising solutions, which included video ads, photos ads, banner 
ads, the creation of events, Facebook pages and sponsored stories in News Feed. The company 
intended to create and test new additional products for marketers and advertisers, “while 
continuing to balance […] monetization objectives with [Facebook’s] commitment to 
optimizing the user experience” (Facebook’s Registration Statement, February 2012, p.81). 
However, Facebook’s business was also characterized by relevant risk factors. Firstly, the 
company’s revenues were strictly linked with the capacity of retaining existing users and adding 
new ones. If Facebook’s MAUs and DAUs started to decline, the performance and financial 
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 Source of Data: “Facebook User Penetration Worldwide” (eMarketer, 2012) 
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Figure 19 – Facebook User Penetration Worldwide in 2010 and 2011, as % of Internet Users.  
(Source: own illustration based on eMarketer, 2012) 
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results of the company would have got worse; so, growth trends in MAUs and DAUs were 
critically important for the performance of the company. Moreover, the substantial majority of 
revenue came from advertising and advertisers did not have long-term advertising commitment 
with Facebook: if Facebook new and experimental ads failed to prove successful, it would have 
lost most of its advertisers.  
Another important problem was related with Facebook’s mobile products. Facebook user 
growth was mostly due to new mobile users; however, ads were not displayed on mobile devices 
and so the social network was not able to generate relevant revenue from Facebook mobile 
products. Indeed, in 2011, a successful monetization strategy for mobile users was still not be 
developed and this represented a critical issue for Facebook. As shown in Figure 20, US Mobile 
internet advertising had started to increase rapidly: it increased of 64.1% in 2010, of 143.8% in 
2011 and of 119.9% in 2012. Non-Mobile advertising accounted for almost 95% of total US 
online advertising in 2011, but the percentage decreased to 90% in 201239. Mobile advertising 
was growing at really high rates: as reported in Facebook’s IPO prospectus (p.79), “the global 
mobile advertising market was $1.5 billion in 2010 and [was] expected to grow at a 64% 
compound annual rate to $17.6 billion in 2015”. So, Facebook needed to create and implement 
a successful monetization strategy for its mobile products, because it already had more than 425 
million MAUs in 2011 who utilized its mobile products and an important part of its users was 
substituting Facebook’s desktop website with Facebook’s mobile website or mobile app; and, 
also, because advertisers were increasingly investing in mobile advertising.  
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 Source: “US Online Advertising Revenues” (IAB and Pwc, 2014). 
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Additionally, Facebook’s business was characterized by strong competition. Google, Twitter, 
LinkedIn, Microsoft and other Internet companies offered services and products similar and in 
competition with Facebook’s ones. Some of these companies had more resources and, above 
all, a better market position; consequently, Facebook’s success depended on its ability to 
effectively compete by creating attractive products, enhancing user engagement, investing in 
marketing activities, enlarging user base, building a strong brand and monitoring competitors. 
In 2011, Facebook was the most used social network worldwide, but Twitter was becoming 
increasingly widespread and Google+ had just been launched. Additionally, there were new 
social networks (for example, Instagram and Snapchat which were launched, respectively, in 
2010 and 2011) that offered new options and functions to their users and that rapidly started to 
acquire and engage users at the expense of the growth of the other social networks. In order to 
continue its growth strategy, Facebook intended “to make acquisitions to add specialized 
employees, complementary companies, products, or technologies” (Facebook’s Registration 
Statement, February 2012, p.25); for this purpose, Facebook acquired Instagram in the first half 
of 2012. 
The company was also exposed to actions made by governments to restrict the access to 
Facebook in their countries and influenced by U.S. and foreign laws and regulations regarding 
privacy and data protection. For example, in 2011, the access to Facebook was forbidden in 
China, North Korea, Iran and Syria. If several other countries had started to restrict the access 
to Facebook, the company would have not been able to maintain its growth forecasts. 
Finally, the business was also influenced by the development of new technologies to which 
Facebook had to rapidly adapt. Indeed, Facebook’s mobile products and app depended upon 
effective operation with smartphone operating system. Moreover, Facebook needed also to 
control the impact of new programs and technologies that were created to block, obscure or 
eliminate the display of any ads and commercial contents in the social network’s desktop 
website and mobile app. 
 
 
Ownership Structure and the Rise of Facebook Valuation before the IPO 
As reported in the section “Principal and Selling Stockholders” of the IPO prospectus, before 
the initial public offering the CEO and Facebook founder, Mark Zuckerberg, held 28.4% of 
Class B shares, which granted ten times the voting power of Class A shares. Although 
Zuckerberg had only 28.2% of total Facebook shares, he controlled the majority of voting rights 
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thanks to the voting agreements that he had established with other important shareholders who 
had ceded their voting rights to him. These “shares subject to voting proxy” gave him another 
30.6% of the voting rights: this permitted Zuckerberg to possess the 56.9% of total voting 
power. The other executive officers and directors, considered as a group, owned the 12.9% of 
Class B shares; among them, only Peter Thiel (the first angel investor that invested in Facebook) 
had more than 1% of Class B shares and voting rights (he owned the 2.5% of Class B shares). 
The American venture capital firm, Accel Partners, had invested in Facebook in the first half 
of 2005 and was the first venture capital investor in the company. Accel Partners, together with 
James W. Breyer (the managing partner that in 2011 was still in Facebook’s board of directors), 
had 11.4% of Class B shares and the same percentage of voting rights. Another investment 
company, Digital Sky Technologies (DST) Global, owned the 31.4% of Class A shares and the 
5.4% of Class B shares (with a total 5.5% of voting rights). Goldman Sachs (and entities 
affiliated with Goldman Sachs) had 56.3% of Class A shares but less than 1% of voting power, 
while T. Rowe Price (another global investment management firm) had 5.2% of Class A shares 
and 0.6% of Class B shares.  
Finally, one of the co-founders of Facebook, Dustin Moskovitz, who left the company in 2008, 
had 7.6% of Class B shares before the IPO. The other co-founders, who left the company or 
were liquidated by Zuckerberg, held smaller percentage of shares at the end of 2011. The 
remaining shares and voting powers were divided by several venture capital firms and smaller 
angel investors. In Table 17, it is summarized the ownership structure of Facebook before the 
company went public, while in Figure 21 it is reported the percentage of voting rights. From 
the graph (Figure 21), it is possible to observe that the CEO, Mark Zuckerberg, controlled the 
majority of Facebook’s voting rights (56.9%). 
Executive Officers and Directors Investors 
Name of Owner Class B Name of Owner Class A Class B 
Mark Zuckerberg 28.4% Accel Partners  - 11.4% 
Shares Subject to voting proxy 30.6% DST Global 31.4% 5.4% 
Total Mark Zuckerberg 57.1% Goldman Sachs 56.3% - 
Peter A. Thiel 2.5% T. Rowe  5.2% 0.6% 
Other Ex. Officers and Directors 10.4% Dustin Moskovitz - 7.6% 
Total (excluding Zuckerberg) 12.9% Other Investors 7.1% 5% 
Total 70% Total 100% 30% 
Table 17 – Facebook’s Ownership Structure before the IPO. (Source: own illustration based on Facebook’s Registration 
Statement, February 2012) 
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From the birth of Facebook in 2004 to the end of 2011, the company received several financings 
from angel investors and venture capital firms. Venture capital firms’ investments in Facebook 
were based on their own valuations of the company that drastically increased in the years before 
the IPO. The first angel investor, Peter Thiel, invested $0.5 million at the end of 2004 for 10.2% 
of equity stake, giving an implicit valuation of Facebook of about $5 million. In 2005, Accel 
Partners invested $12.7 million and valued the company $100 million; while in 2007, Microsoft 
invested $240 million for the 1.6% of equity stake. In 2009, Digital Sky Technologies (DST) 
valued the company $10 billion and invested $200 million for the 2% of equity stake. Finally, 
in 2011, Goldman Sachs valued the company at $50 billion and invested, together with DST 
Technologies, $500 million. Table 18 shows the principal financings received from 2004 to 
2011, with the associated valuation made by investors at the time of their investments in the 
company. From Table 18, it is possible to observe both the growth of Facebook’s valuation and 
the growth of the amounts invested by angel investors and venture capital firms since the 
company's incorporation date to the year before the IPO.   
Year of Investment Investors Amount Invested Facebook Valuation 
2004 Peter Thiel $0.5 million $5 million 
2005 Accel Partners $12.7 million $100 million 
2006 
Greylock Partners, 
Meritech Capital 
$27.5 million $500 million 
2007 Microsoft $240 million $15 billion 
2009 DST $200 million $10 billion 
2010 Elevation Partners $120 million $23 billion 
2011 Goldman Sachs, DST $500 million $50 billion 
Table 18 – Amount Invested by Angel Investors and Venture Capital Firms from 2004 to 2011,  
and their Associated Facebook Valuation. (Source: own illustration based on  
“Tracking Facebook’s Valuation”, DealBook - New York Times, February 2012) 
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4.3 - THE FACEBOOK IPO PROCESS 
Facebook announced its IPO on February 1, 2012 by filing Form S-1 Registration Statemen 
with SEC. The initial public offering was scheduled for May 2012 and it was initially expected 
to raise $5 billion for the company. The announcement of the IPO was awaited by financial 
community; indeed, Facebook was approaching the maximum number of shareholders that a 
private company could have without the duty of public disclosure: companies with a number of 
shareholders exceeding 500, were required to register under the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 and comply with reporting requirement. So, Facebook needed to conform to public 
company disclosure rules, but it was not required to list its shares and go public; nevertheless, 
since it would have become subject to much of the regulation of public companies, Facebook 
decided to launch the IPO at the beginning of 2012 and get the full benefits of being public. 
Facebook’s IPO was one of the largest IPOs of all time and was considered “by many investors 
the greatest deal after Google’s Listing” (Cervellati, Di Sandro and Piras, 2013, p.6). The 
company leaded by Zuckerberg went public in a period characterized by several successful 
internet-related IPOs and considered by some authors an “hot issue market”: LinkedIn and 
Yandex N.V. went public a year before Facebook and gained, respectively, more than 100% 
and more than 55% on their first day of trading, Groupon went public in November 2011 and 
registered an underpricing of more than 30%, Zynga went public in December 2011 and, 
although its first day closing price was below the offer price, its shares gained about 50% in the 
first ten weeks; Millennial Media and Youku.com went public few weeks before Facebook and 
gained respectively more than 90% and more than 110% on their first day of trading. 
Additionally, as it has been observed in Chapter 340, considering the period from 2000 to 2013, 
the years 2010-2013 were characterized by the second highest average level of underpricing for 
internet-related IPOs (31.65%), after the one of “Dot-com bubble” years (2000-2001).  
The launch of Facebook IPO was perceived with great enthusiasm by investors and there was 
a strong demand for Facebook stocks during pre-IPO marketing activities. During the road 
show, which started on May 7 in Manhattan, the demand became increasingly higher: the IPO 
was oversubscribed, and the company decided to increase the number of shares offered few 
days before the offering41. Although the real value of the company was difficult to be evaluated, 
most investors believed that Facebook’s shares represented a good investment, given the 
numbers that the social network had been able to reach in only seven years from its launch. 
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 See “Descriptive Analysis” (Chapter 3). 
41
 See next paragraph “Underwriters, Price Determination and Shares Offered”. 
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Underwriters, Price determination and Shares Offered  
Given its dimension, Facebook IPO had several underwriters; the most important were: Morgan 
Stanley, J.P. Morgan, Goldman Sachs, Bank of America – Merrill Lynch, Barclays Capital and 
Allen & Company. The lead underwriter chosen by the company was Morgan Stanley, which 
had already led some of the biggest tech and internet-related IPOs concluded in previous years, 
like Google (2004), Zynga (2011) and LinkedIn (2011)42. 
The initial price range for Facebook shares, conveyed at the beginning of the road show, was 
$28 - $35, which implied a valuation of the company in the range of $77 billion to $96 billion. 
On May 15, three days before the listing, given the strong demand for Facebook shares, the 
company decided to increase the price range to $34 - $38. According to the preliminary 
prospectus, Facebook planned to sell more than 337 million of shares. The company had a dual-
class stock structure and shares offered were only Class A shares; it was stated that CEO 
Zuckerberg, after the IPO, would have retained the 22% of total shares but the control of more 
than 55% of the voting power. After the increase of the price range, Facebook decided to also 
increase the number of shares offered by 84 million shares (25% more compared to the shares 
offered originally proposed). The increase came from the shares offered by the selling 
stockholders: in the final prospectus it was specified that Facebook Inc. was offering 180 
million of Class A shares, while the selling stockholders were offering 241 million of their 
Class A shares (the 57% of the total 421 million shares offered, as shown in Figure 22). 
On May 17, the day before the IPO, the price was set at $38 at the top of the proposed price 
range. This meant that, with all the 421 million of shares sold, the IPO raised about $16 billion 
and valued the company at approximately $104 billion. In 2004, Google’s IPO, which was the 
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 As it has been examined in Chapter 3 (“Descriptive Analysis”), Facebook’s IPO was marketed by the most 
prestigious and reputed underwriters, like all the other biggest IPOs of the period analysed. 
180 million
43%241 million57%
Facebook Inc. Selling Stockholders
Figure 22 – Shares offered in Facebook’s IPO by the Company and by the 
Selling Stockholders. (Source: own illustration based on Facebook’ 
Registration Statement, February 2012) 
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largest internet-IPO of the period 2000-2011 (before Facebook’s IPO)43, raised less than $1.7 
billion and valued the company (Google Inc.) about $26 billion. As affirmed by Rusli and Eavis 
(2012), Facebook’s market value (at $104 billion) was higher than those of McDonald’s, 
Citigroup and Amazon.  
From Figure 23, it is possible to observe Facebook’s valuation (at the IPO) in comparison with 
the valuations (at the IPO) of some of the most important internet-related companies that went 
public in the period 2000-2013, and with the valuations (at the IPO) of Facebook’s most 
important competitors: Google, Twitter, Groupon are the internet firms with the highest market 
capitalization (after Facebook) in the period 2000-2013; while LinkedIn and Snapchat are 
Facebook’s competitors since they are social network companies. Particularly, it is interesting 
to the see how Facebook was valued at the IPO in relation with the other social networks’ 
valuations: Facebook’s valuation was more than four times higher than Snapchat’s one, more 
than seven times Twitter’s one and approximately twenty-five times higher than LinkedIn’s 
one. 
 
The Last Days Before the IPO and the Debut on the Stock Market 
At the end of April, Facebook communicated its results for the first quarter of the year 2012: 
Facebook’s revenue had considerably grown compared to the first quarter of 2011 (+44,7%) 
but had decreased of 6,5% compared to the fourth quarter of 2011 and profit had fallen of 12% 
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Figure 23 – Company Valuation at IPO. Data in billions of US Dollars. (Source: own illustration 
based on: CB Insights, 2017 and Statista, 2016) 
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due to higher expenses incurred (+97,4%)44. The company reported in the prospectus that costs 
and expenses would have continued to grow and that there was the risk that costs could grow 
more quickly than their revenue in the future. These results were not considered an alarming 
signal by investors (above all by retail investors) because the company continued to grow at 
high rates, advertising revenue were driven by seasonal trends and the increased costs were also 
associated with marketing expenses related to the IPO.  
Monthly active users continued to increase and at the end of March MAUs were more than 900 
million. Nevertheless, on May 9, Facebook filed Amendment No. 6 to the Registration 
Statement, in which the company reported that worldwide MAUs were increasing above all 
thanks to the strong growth of mobile MAUs, that increased by 69% in the first quarter of 2012 
(from 288 million as of March 31, 2011 to 488 million as of March 31, 2012). The company 
reported also that an important number of users (approximately 83 million) accessed the social 
network solely through mobile apps or the mobile website and that this number was expected 
to increase steadily. Facebook had never shown ads in its mobile website and mobile apps; so, 
the company expressed its concern about the fact that users (MAUs and DAUs) were increasing 
more rapidly than the increase in the number of ads delivered and that, consequently, the 
average revenue per user (ARPU) was decreasing. The problem related with Facebook’s 
unproved ability to generate revenue from mobile products and the negative impact that 
increasing mobile-only users were having on advertising revenue, were communicated only 
few days before the IPO and after the beginning of the road show. In addition, on May 15 (only 
three days before the IPO), as reported by Terlep, Vranica and Raice (2012) and described by 
Lee (2014), General Motors, considered one of the largest advertisers in U.S., communicated 
that it would stop paid advertising on Facebook, after having already invested more than $10 
million, because Facebook paid ads did not have a big impact on consumers’ purchases. 
Considering Facebook’s problems with its mobile business and the company’s not exciting first 
quarter results, the lead underwriter Morgan Stanley and analysts at J.P. Morgan, Goldman 
Sachs and Bank of America reduced Facebook’s revenue and earnings estimates few days 
before the issue. As stated by Doring (2013, p.47), “such a change in a company’s revenue 
forecasts by an underwriter so close to the IPO was unprecedent”. Morgan Stanley and the other 
investment banks did not disclose their new forecasts during the road show, but advised only 
select institutional investors. Retail investors were not informed of the lowered estimates and, 
few days after the listing, when information became public, Morgan Stanley was accused of 
selective disclosure. Indeed, the lead underwriter, that had cut Facebook’s revenue growth rates, 
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 See Appendix B (“Quarterly Consolidated Income Statement”). 
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informed only its “best” institutional clients and did not make public this information because 
it would have led to a decrease in the offer price and probably to a strong decrease in the demand 
of Facebook’s shares, causing the failure of the IPO.  
On May 17, there was Facebook’s IPO pricing committee. There was a conference call between 
Facebook’s CFO David Ebersman, other member of Facebook’s board and Morgan Stanley 
representatives. They had to decide the IPO final price and, as described by Diamond (2012), 
the CEO of Morgan Stanley (James Gorman) was also present on this call. Gorman’s presence 
on a pricing call was highly unusual: “the most plausible reason for his joining the call is that 
bankers handling the transaction needed him to help push back against the CFO and the 
Facebook board because of a disagreement over the price of the IPO” (Diamond, 2012, p.12). 
Indeed, while Facebook tried to even increase IPO price above $40, the investment banks 
wanted to lower the price since they knew the risks related with overpricing the IPO. The lead 
underwriter communicated that institutional investors were not willing to pay a price higher 
than the range $34-$38 previously communicated and, finally, the price was set at $38. 
On May 18, U.S. stock market opened regularly at 9:30am. The debut of Facebook was 
expected at 11:00am, but shares trading did not start until 11:30am, due to NASDAQ’s software 
problems. During the first 30 minutes, the volume of buy and sell orders was extremely high 
(about 80 million of shares were sold in the first 30 seconds). NASDAQ’s software was 
overwhelmed: “investors were unsure of which stock price was being matched with their orders 
because of the delays and software problems” (Doring, 2013, p.48). The stock opened at $42, 
but then came back down and closed the first day of trading at $38.23. The closing price stayed 
above the offer price thanks to underwriters’ intervention: they started to buy back shares to 
support stock price. Price support continued in the following days, but this did not prevent the 
price from falling: in three days of trading the stock lost 18% of its value. After ten days of 
trading, Facebook’s stock price was almost 30% below the offer price. At the end of August, 
three months after the IPO, stock reached its lowest price at $18, more than 50% below its $38 
IPO price. This meant that, in just three months of listing, the company lost about $50 billion 
of its market capitalization.  
Several different lawsuits and class actions were filed against Facebook, its CEO Zuckerberg, 
the underwriters and NASDAQ. Facebook and Morgan Stanley were accused of selective 
disclosure of material information, but lawsuits were unsuccessful because the company 
demonstrated that all the information and warnings regarding the trend of MAUs, the problems 
with Facebook’s mobile business and the increase in costs and expenses, were included both in 
the preliminary and in the final prospectus. Moreover, Facebook and Morgan Stanley did not 
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have a duty to disclose specific revenue and earnings forecasts. “It appeared that all relevant 
information was available to the market. It would therefore be difficult for the plaintiffs to 
demonstrate that the stock price was inaccurate when taking into account all of the information 
available to investors at the stock opening” (Doring, 2013, p.64). Finally, NASDAQ settled its 
lawsuit45 and agreed to pay $26.5 million to compensate investors who realized profit losses 
due to technological problems of the software. 
 
4.4 - THE VALUATION OF FACEBOOK 
The real value of Facebook was difficult to be evaluated at the time of the IPO. As it has been 
reported in the previous paragraphs, the final offer price ($38) set the company’s valuation at 
approximately $104 billion: a really high value, considering that this was the highest IPO 
valuation among internet companies in the history46. Nevertheless, Facebook’s stock realized a 
strong negative performance in the first months after the stock market debut and the company 
lost about $50 billion of its market capitalization in just three months of listing. Was the 
company overvalued at IPO price?  
To analyse whether Facebook was overvalued at the IPO, I decided to provide an evaluation of 
the company using Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) methodology. I started examining the income 
data and the financial information reported in Facebook’s Registration Statement, which are 
summarized in Table 19. 
Revenue $3.71 billion in 2011 ($1.97 billion in 2010) 
Revenue Growth +88% in 2011 (+154% in 2010) 
EBIT Margin 46% in 2011 (51% in 2010) 
Tax Rate 41% in 2011 (40% in 2010) 
Cash $1.51 billion at the end of 2011 
Debt $1.14 billion at the end of 201147 
Preferred Stocks $615 million at the end of 2011 
Table 19 - Summary of Financial Statement Data for DCF Valuation Model 
(Source: own illustration based on Facebook’s Registration Statement, February 2012)  
                                                          
45
 Plaintiffs “alleged that NASDAQ made material misrepresentations and omissions regarding the capabilities of 
its technology to be able to handle the massive volume involved in launching the Facebook IPO” (Pustorino, 2015, 
p.133). 
46
 Today, the highest IPO valuation belongs to Alibaba (around $167 billion) and Facebook has the second highest 
IPO valuation among internet companies. (Source: Statista, 2017) 
47
 I calculated the value of the debt at the end of 2011, as the sum of 398 million of capital lease (reported in the 
2011 balance sheet) and the discounted operating lease that amounted to 749 million. 
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In the DCF analysis, it has been used an explicit forecast period of 10 years; Facebook’s value 
beyond the explicit forecast period is estimated through the terminal value formula. Facebook’s 
Registration Statement did not report any specific revenue and earnings forecasts and, so I 
assumed that Facebook’s revenue growth rates and profitability would have been similar to 
Google’s ones in the years after its IPO. This is a strong assumption, but it is based on different 
reasons: first of all, both Google and Facebook are internet companies and, specifically, are the 
biggest internet companies (considering firms’ market capitalization) that went public in the 
period 2000-2013. Both companies generate most of their revenues from the online advertising 
and they also had similar level of revenues at the time of their IPO (Facebook’s revenues were 
$3.71 billion, while Google’s ones were $3.14 billion). Moreover, the age of the companies at 
their IPO was similar (Google was 6 years old while Facebook 8 years old) and, also their 
revenue growth paths before the IPO were fairly in line. Assuming that Facebook’s growth 
could resemble to Google’s one is an optimistic scenario; indeed, Google grew steadily at high 
rates in the ten years after its IPO and became the world’s leading search engine and, 
particularly, the leader of the online advertising market.   
After having analysed Google’s revenue growth rates and profitability, I made the following 
assumptions to perform Facebook’s DCF valuation: 
• Revenue Growth: extremely high growth rates in the first years, that steadily decrease 
during all the explicit forecast period. In the analysis I used an annual average growth 
of approximately 50% for the first 5 years (2012-2016) and of approximately 20% from 
year 6 to year 10 (2017-2021). Facebook’s revenue growth rates are based on Google’s 
average growth rates in the years 2005-2009 and 2010-2014 (the years after Google’s 
IPO).  
• EBIT margin: Facebook’s EBIT margin was 51% in 2010 and 46% in 2011. During the 
explicit forecast period, I assumed that EBIT margin decreases steadily because, as 
stated in Facebook’s Registration Statement, costs are expected to increase both in the 
dollar amount and as a percentage of revenue to support the company’s growth. At the 
end of the forecast period, EBIT margin is stable at 30% of revenue, which is the average 
Google’s EBIT margin in the long period.  
• Sales to Capital Ratio (Reinvestments): to calculate the reinvestments needed each year 
to sustain the projected revenue growth, I used the Sales to Capital ratio (as made by A. 
Damodaran, in his Facebook’s valuation48). I assumed that Facebook maintains the 
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 Damodaran (2017), p.188. 
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same average Sale to Capital ratio of Google in the first 5 years (0.9549), and that, from 
year 6, Facebook’s Sales to Capital ratio is equal to the mean Sales to Capital ratio of 
internet sector (1,350). 
• Tax Rate: Facebook’s Tax rate in 2011 was 41%. In the analysis, I used the same Tax 
Rate both in the explicit forecast period and in the terminal year.  
• Cost of Capital: I used the average cost of capital of the American advertising and 
internet companies. For the first 5 years, I used a cost of capital of 9.90%, which is 
calculated as the mean of the cost of capital for US companies in the advertising sector 
and in the internet sector in 2011. From year 6, I used a cost of capital of 8.27%, which 
is calculated as the mean of the cost of capital for US companies in the advertising sector 
and in the internet sector in 201651. 
• Final Growth Rate: as made by A. Damodaran (2017) in his Facebook’s valuation, I 
assumed a Final Growth rate of 2% that is also, as stated by Damodaran (2017), the 
most used Final Growth rate in DCF analysis. 
As it is possible to observe from the results reported in Figure 24 (page 85), I obtained an 
estimated value per shares of $27.94, that is about $10 lower than the IPO offer price. The value 
of equity calculated using the DCF valuation is $76.5 billion, more than 26% lower than the 
valuation of $104 billion set by the IPO final price. Considering these results and the fact that 
the analysis was based on an optimistic scenario, Facebook was overvalued at the time of the 
IPO and its valuation was not justified by its fundamentals.  
Nevertheless, as it is possible to observe from the sensitivity analysis52, the value per share 
obtained is highly sensitive to changes in “Final Growth Rate” and “Cost of Capital”. With a 
“Final Growth Rate” of 3% (instead of 2%), maintaining all other assumptions unchanged, the 
value per share increases to $33.15; while with a “Final Growth Rate” of 1% the value per share 
decreases to $24.16. Table 23 (in Appendix C) shows that, using the average cost of capital for 
firms in the advertising sector and maintaining all other assumptions unchanged, the value per 
share increases to $38.64; while using the average cost of capital for firms in the internet sector, 
the value per share decreases to $21.81. Finally, it is possible to note from Table 24 (in 
Appendix C) that value per share is also highly sensitive to changes in “EBIT Margin”; with an 
EBIT Margin of 40% (in Terminal Year), the value per share increases to $39.49, while with 
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 Source: own calculation based on Google’s Financial Statements of the years 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009. 
50
 Source: own calculation based on Damodaran Data (“Sales to Capital Ratios by Industry”) of the year 2011, 
2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016. Available at: http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/ [Accessed 12 November 2017] 
51
 The average cost of capital of US Advertising and Internet Sector are taken from Damodaran Data. “Cost of 
Capital by Industry” available at: http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/ [Accessed 12 November 2017] 
52
 See Appendix C. 
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an EBIT Margin of 20% the value decreases to $16.39. Table 24 (Appendix C) also shows that 
the value per share is only moderately sensitive to the changes in “Sales to Capital Ratio”. 
To verify if revenue growth rates used in the explicit forecast period are plausible, I compared 
(ex post) the Facebook’s 2016 total revenue with the 2016 estimated revenue calculated in the 
DCF valuation. I observed that Facebook’s 2016 total revenue ($27.64 billion53) and the 2016 
estimated revenue based on DCF revenue projections ($29.83 billion) are similar, and so that 
revenue growth rates used in the explicit forecast period can be considered plausible. 
Additionally, also comparing Facebook’s multiples with Google’s ones, and with the average 
multiples of US companies in the Internet and in the Advertising sector, it is possible to 
concluded that Facebook was overvalued. Indeed, as shown in Table 20, Facebook had a Price-
Earnings ratio extremely high (104.16), that was almost five times higher Google’s P/E, almost 
three times higher the average P/E ratio of companies in the Internet sector, and almost nine 
times higher the average P/E ratio of companies in the Advertising sector. Considering Price to 
Sales ratio, the difference was even bigger between Facebook (28.07) and Google (4.61). 
Finally, Facebook had an EV/EBIT and an EV/EBITDA which were more than three times 
higher Google’s ones and almost double with respect to Internet sector. 
 P/E P/Sales EV/EBIT EV/EBITDA 
Facebook54 104.16 28.07 45.24 38.21 
Google55 21.65 4.61 14.84 12.05 
Internet Sector56 36.16 4.60 21.41 17.06 
Advertising Sector57 12.38 1.00 11.09 7.90 
Table 20 – P/E, P/Sales, EV/EBIT and EV/EBITDA Multiples in the year 2012. (Source: own illustration)   
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 Source: Facebook’s 2016 Income Statement. 
54
 Facebook’s multiples are calculated at the time of the IPO, using the final offer price ($38). 
55
 Source: Bloomberg.  
56
 Source: Damodaran “Multiples by Industry Sector”. 
57
 Source: Damodaran “Multiples by Industry Sector”. 
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2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2018 2019 2020 2021
65% 60% 50% 45% 25% 20% 15% 10%
3.711 6.123 9.797 14.696 21.309 50.341 60.410 69.471 76.418
46% 42% 40% 38% 38% 32% 30% 30% 30%
2.572 3.919 5.584 8.097 16.109 18.123 20.841 22.926
41% 41% 41% 41% 41% 41% 41% 41% 41%
1.517 2.312 3.295 4.777 9.504 10.693 12.296 13.526
0,95
2.539 3.867 5.156 6.961 7.745 7.745 6.970 5.344
-1.022 -1.555 -1.862 -2.184 1.760 2.948 5.326 8.182
9,90% 9,90% 9,90% 9,90% 8,27% 8,27% 8,27% 8,27%
-930 -1.288 -1.403 -1.497 937 1.449 2.418 3.431
Final Growth Rate 2% 2011 2017
Terminal Value 179.636 11,42% 6,57%
PV (Terminal Value) 75.329 8,37% 9,97%
NPV 76.829 9,90% 8,27%
Cash 1.512 7,27% $30,77 $33,38 $36,49 $40,24 $44,88
Debt 1.147 7,77% $27,19 $29,31 $31,81 $34,77 $38,36
Preferred Stock 615 8,27% $24,16 $25,91 $27,94 $30,32 $33,15
Value of Equity 76.579 Value per share $27,94 8,77% $21,55 $23,01 $24,68 $26,62 $28,89
N° of Shares 2.741 IPO Final Price $38,00 9,27% $19,30 $20,53 $21,92 $23,52 $25,37
Numbers highlited by light blue color are based on my assumptions
FCF
Cost of Capital*
PV (FCF)
*Cost Of Capital
Tax Rate
EBIT(1-Tax Rate)
Sales to capital ratio
Reinvestments 
Revenue Growth
Revenue
EBIT (Margin)
EBIT 
2017
35%
40.273
34%
13.693
41%
14.202
2.939
11.263
8,27%
Terminal Year
5%
80.239
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24.072
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41%
8.079
1,3
8.032
47
9,90%
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Cost of Capital
9,90%
-1.644
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
8,27%
27
Final Growth Rate 
8,90%
9,40%
1% 1.5% 2% 2.5% 3%
2016
40%
29.832
36%
10.740
41%
6.336
8.972
-2.636
Figure 24 – Facebook: DCF Valuation (Source: own illustration). 
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4.5 - THE REASONS BEHIND THE “FAILURE” OF THE IPO 
In the previous paragraphs, it has been described the Facebook’s IPO process, the company’s 
performance and situation before the IPO, and the stock market debut; additionally, it has been 
reported the valuation of Facebook (at the time of the IPO) performed using DCF methodology. 
In the last part of this chapter, it is analysed the reasons of the failure of the IPO and the causes 
of the short-term negative stock performance. 
The first reason is related to the valuation of the company. At the IPO price, Facebook’s was 
overvalued. The market value of more than $100 billion was extremely high if compared with 
Google’s market value. At the time of Facebook’s IPO, Google’s market capitalization was just 
over $200 billion, but its 2011 revenue were $37.9 billion, its net income was almost $10 billion, 
and, above all, Google’s revenues were steadily increasing at high growth rates (at the end of 
2012, Google’s revenues were more than $50 billion and net income was almost $11 billion). 
If these results are compared to Facebook’s one (revenue were $3.7 billion in 2011 and net 
income was $1 billion58), it is easy to understand that Facebook was overvalued based on 
fundamentals. This is confirmed by the fact that Facebook’s shares at the IPO price were trading 
at about 100 times their earnings per share59: the company’s P/E ratio was almost five times 
higher than Google’s P/E60. Young internet-related and high-tech companies are difficult to be 
evaluated, but Facebook’s valuations could be justified only by revenue growth rates almost 
impossible to achieve. In DCF analysis, to estimate Facebook’s future revenues, I used the same 
revenue growth path realized by Google in the ten years after its IPO (so, I assumed that 
Facebook would have reached revenue levels similar to the ones of Google, that was the leader 
of the online advertising market) and I obtained a value of equity that was more than 26% lower 
than Facebook’s market capitalization at the IPO.   
In 2012, Facebook was growing faster the Google and in the three years before the IPO the 
company had astonishing growth rates (revenue increased of about 185%, 154% and 88% 
respectively in 2009, 2010 and 2011); nevertheless, it was difficult to foresee similar growth 
rates in the long term, considering that the revenue growth was already slowing down (as it is 
possible to observe from Figure 25) and considering the problems that Facebook was facing 
with its mobile business. Moreover, Facebook’s ARPU (average revenue per user) was still 
low: as reported in Facebook’s “First Quarter 2012 Financial Results”, ARPU was just $1.21 
in the first quarter of 2012, while LinkedIn and Google had an ARPU respectively of $1.76 and 
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 See the paragraph “Facebook Financial Results”. 
59
 Facebook’s Price-Earnings ratio at the IPO stock price was around 104. 
60
 See the paragraph “The valuation of Facebook”.  
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$7.14 in the same period61. Additionally, as reported by the prospectus, also costs and expenses 
were increasing rapidly and there was the risk that they increased more quickly than revenue. 
Finally, monthly and daily active user quarterly growth rates were always positive but 
decreasing significantly from quarter to quarter and sustained above all by mobile user growth 
(as shown in Figure 26); moreover, the most important growth opportunities for the social 
network came from the entrance in new countries where Facebook was exposed to the actions 
made by governments to restrict its access. Figure 25 and Figure 26 show, respectively, the 
trend in quarterly revenue growth and the growth trend of monthly, daily and mobile active 
user: it is possible to note that growth rates were rapidly slowing down from quarter to quarter.  
The overvaluation of Facebook’s stocks at the time of the IPO must be analysed also in relation 
with the number of shares sold by Facebook’s insider and selling stockholders. About 57% of 
the total shares offered in the IPO came from the company’s insider, who sold more than 241 
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 ARPU Data are taken from Comscore, 2011.  
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Figure 25 - Facebook's Quarterly Revenue and Quarterly Revenue Growth.  
(Source: own illustration based on Facebook’s 2011 and 2012 Financial Statements) 
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million shares. As reported by Diamond (2012), Zuckerberg sold about 30 million shares, Peter 
Thiel sold almost 17 million shares, Digital Sky Technologies (DST) sold more than 45 million 
shares and Goldman Sachs more than 24 million. Of the total $16 billion raised with the IPO, 
about $9 billion went to insiders, $6.7 billion went to the company and almost $180 million 
went to the underwriters in fees and commissions. Normally, the percentage of insider sales is 
much smaller (as it is possible to note from Figure 27) and in many cases pre-IPO investors are 
even not allowed to cash out their investments during the IPO (for example in Zynga IPO, 
management and employees could not sell any shares for 165-days after the IPO, due to a lock-
up agreement). In the Facebook IPO, key insiders were allowed to sell their shares immediately 
without any restrictions, and the number of shares offered by them increased significantly few 
days before the IPO, when Facebook and Morgan Stanley decided to increase the number of 
shares offered of 25%. As it has been reported in the literature review, Grinblatt and Hwang 
(1989) showed that IPO initial returns are positively related to the retention rate of pre-IPO 
owners, and that the decision to retain part of the shares issued is used by firm’s managers to 
signal their optimism about firm’s future prospects and value. Consequently, the fact the 
Facebook’s pre-IPO owners were selling a large part of their shares can be interpreted as a 
signal that they considered Facebook’s shares as overvalued. 
Shares in an initial public offering are primarily allocated to institutional investors, while retail 
investors receive between 10% and 15% of the total offerings; for this reason, retail investors 
usually tend to order more shares because they will receive only a percentage of shares ordered. 
In Facebook’s IPO, retail investors obtained a large portion of total shares: retail investors were 
the less informed parts about the lowered revenue and earnings estimates and about the negative 
impact that Facebook’s mobile business problems could have on the growth of the company, 
and given their strong demand, they received 25% of the total 421 million shares offered. That 
meant that of the total $16 billion raised, $4 billion were raised from retail investors: many 
retail investors, who expected a short-term positive return, given the negative price performance 
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and the controversies arisen the days after the IPO, decided to sell their shares in the first weeks 
of trading and reported significant losses. Considering the decision to set the price at the top of 
the price range (that overvalued the IPO), the decision to increase the shares offered, the high 
percentage of shares sold by insiders (who used the IPO as an exit strategy) and the percentage 
of the offering allocated to retail investors, there are grounds for thinking that Facebook’s IPO 
was a “pump-and-dump” scheme: “such a scheme occurs when investors overestimate the 
initial starting value of a stock through unverified future predictions about the stock, and later, 
those investors sell the stock once they fell it has peaked” (Roman, 2012, p.490).  
With a high IPO final price, Facebook did not leave money on the table and the underwriters 
gained almost $180 million in fees and commissions. The spread for underwriters was just 1.1% 
of the offer price and most of fees and commissions went to the lead underwriter Morgan 
Stanley. Additionally, the underwriters had also the possibility to increase by 15% the stock 
supply (“greenshoe option”) and, as reported in the Facebook’s final prospects, “sell more 
shares than they are obligated to purchase under the underwriting agreement, creating a short 
position”. The underwriters sold 484 million shares62 at $38 on the first day of trading and, at 
the same time, they bought 421 million shares from the company and the selling stockholders 
at $37.5863. So, Morgan Stanley and the other investment banks had a short position and needed 
to buy 63 million shares on the open market. The first day of trading, the investment banks 
started to buy back shares at about $38 to support stock price. The following days they 
continued to buy back shares at price below $38 and closed their short position, making profit 
from the stock price drop. So, Morgan Stanley decided to sell more shares than the ones initially 
offered and set the price at the top of the price range, at the same time it cut Facebook’s revenue 
estimates without communicating it to retail investors, and made profit from the stock price 
drop. According to SEC investigations, this was not a conflict of interest situation since the 
“greenshoe option” and the possibility to open short positions were included in the prospectus 
and since Morgan Stanley suffered a reputational damage from this IPO. Nevertheless, this 
situation created much controversies over the Facebook IPO that fostered stocks sales and the 
negative price performance in the first months after the listing.  
As demonstrated by Cervellati, Di Sandro and Piras (2013) and by Lai and Wu (2014), analysts 
affiliated with IPO underwriters provided higher pre-IPO valuations of Facebook, favourable 
coverage and, also, higher target prices after the listing. This was probably due to an implicit 
agreement between the company and its underwriters according to which analysts affiliated 
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 About 63 million (15% of 421 million) were sold thank to the “greenshoe option”. 
63
 The offer price ($38) less the spread (1.1% of the offer price). 
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with underwriters should have issued favourable coverage. However, it was also because 
underwriters’ analysts faced conflict of interests because some of the investment banks that 
were underwriting the IPO, at the same time had invested in Facebook and were selling parts 
of the shares included in the offerings. Goldman Sachs was selling more than 24 million of its 
shares, that meant that it was monetizing more than 40% of its investment in the company. The 
lead underwriter itself had important investments in the social-network company and bought 
private shares of Facebook through its mutual funds few months before the IPO. So, it is clear 
that underwriters’ analysts faced relevant conflict of interests when valuing the IPO and stocks’ 
target price: Lai and Wu (2014) showed that analysts affiliated with the lead underwriters 
provided more optimistic coverage, while Cervellati, Di Sandro and Piras (2013) demonstrated 
that underwriters’ valuations were higher than other investment banks’ valuations and that, as 
shown in Table 21, Goldman Sachs’ target prices were always at least $5/$10 above the target 
prices predicted by Credit Suisse and Bernstein (which were not underwriting the IPO). 
 June 2012 October 2012 November 2012 January 2013 February 2013 
Goldman Sachs $42 $37  $35 $35 $40 
Credit Suisse $34 $24 - $31 $31 
Bernstein $25 - $33 $33 $27 
Table 21 – Facebook Stock Target Price after the IPO. (Source: own illustration  
based on Cervellati, Di Sandro and Piras, 2013) 
Moreover, the weak stock market debut was caused by problems related to NASDAQ’s 
software. On the day of the listing (Friday, May 18), the stock price did not take off, as was 
expected by the majority of investors. NASDAQ’s software technical problems firstly delayed 
the listing and then caused a lot of problems to investors that were not able to see whether their 
orders were correctly executed or not. This situation created lots of confusion and worries 
among investors and traders. The stock opened around $42 but rapidly went down and remained 
above the offer price only thanks to the price support provided by underwriters; it closed slightly 
above $38, in line with the offer price, meaning that there was not underpricing. So, the weak 
stock market debut was caused by problems related to the NASDAQ and not related to 
Facebook. Nevertheless, the negative stock performance continued the following days of 
trading, despite NASDAQ’s problems had been resolved. Indeed, between Monday, May 21 
and Tuesday May 22, Reuters reported the news that Morgan Stanley had cut its revenue and 
growth estimates for Facebook few days before the listing, and that this information was 
disclosed only to select institutional investors (selective disclosure). Reuter then added that J.P. 
Morgan and Goldman Sachs had done the same: they reduced revenue and earnings forecasts, 
but did not communicate those changes to ordinary investors. Consequently, investors lost 
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confidence in investing in Facebook’s stocks and the investors’ enthusiasm around the IPO 
rapidly waned. Retail investors, who had over-ordered shares, understood that the company was 
overvalued and started to massively sell, causing the fall of the stock price. For at least the first 
three months after the listing, Facebook’s stock performance was a debacle. As affirmed by 
Cervellati, Di Sandro and Piras (2013, p.15), “the case of Facebook stresses the importance of 
regulations and supervision to ensure transparent financial statement and protect investors”: in 
the Facebook IPO case, selective disclosure, lack of transparency and conflicts of interests 
damaged investors (above all retail investors), provoked the stock price drop and caused 
reputational damages to the company and to the most important underwriters. 
Another element that contributed to reduce investor confidence and that caused the negative 
debut of Facebook in the stock market was related to the fact that the IPO had not been planned 
for a specific reason, but the company decided to go public when it was approaching the number 
of 500 shareholders and was going to become subject to much of the regulation of public 
companies64. The prospectus reported that the principal purpose of the initial public offering 
was “to create a public market for Class A common stocks” and that the company did “not 
currently have any specific uses of the net proceeds” raised. As described in previous 
paragraphs, about 57% of total shares offered in the IPO came from insiders. Considering the 
initial stock performance and the problems arisen, the IPO was seen as a good exit strategy for 
the selling stockholder that benefited from the high offer price to liquidate a relevant part of 
their investments in the company and were able to raise around $9 billion (of the total $16 
billion raised with the IPO). So, Facebook was asking new investors to invest in the IPO and at 
the same time the CEO and the board were cashing out part of their investments; this contributed 
to increase retail investors’ worries, who found that Facebook’s growth forecasts had been 
reduced and that insiders were monetizing their investments in the company: such aggressive 
insider selling was perceived as an alarming signal because, as explained by Draho (2004), 
insiders generally use their private information to monetize totally or part of their investments 
at the most opportune moment, when company’s valuation is high and near its peak. 
Finally, also the dual-class stock structure used by Facebook was another discussed element of 
its IPO. As it is already described in previous paragraphs65, Facebook had a dual-class stock 
structure (Class A shares and Class B shares) which permitted the CEO Zuckerberg to maintain 
more than 55% of voting powers after the IPO, thanks to the super-voting powers granted by 
Class B shares (which were not transferrable, but needed to be converted to Class A shares to 
                                                          
64
 See the paragraph “The Facebook IPO Process”. 
65
 See the paragraph “Underwriters, Price determination and Shares Offered”.  
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be sold) and to the voting agreements that he had with the most important pre-IPO stockholders. 
This concentrated control of the voting power reduced the ability of the new most important 
investors (above all institutional investors) to influence the choices of the company and, 
consequently, as affirmed by Han (2012, p.53), reduced and weakened “incentives for 
shareholder control”. The less power non-controlling shareholders have, the higher the 
probability that their interests will not be protected and the higher the risks that controlling 
shareholders will extract private benefits from their controlling position. Thanks to the dual-
class stock structure, Zuckerberg was preserving the control of the voting power while selling 
part of his shares in the IPO; this contributed to create controversies among investors because 
they considered Facebook’s dual class structure as a way to disenfranchise future non-
controlling shareholders.  
After having described and analysed the causes of Facebook’s negative stock market debut, it 
is possible to conclude that the principal reason behind the failure of the IPO was the company’s 
overvaluation at the offer price. Nevertheless, this was not the only cause: indeed, the 
company’s overvaluation at the IPO price must be considered in relation with the massive 
insider selling that characterized the offering and with the high percentage of shares allocated 
to retail investors, that were the less informed investors. The overvaluation must be also 
considered in relation with the conflict of interests that underwriters’ analysts faced when 
valuing the IPO, since some of the investment banks that were underwriting Facebook’s IPO, 
at the same time had invested in the company and were selling parts of the shares included in 
the offerings. Additionally, the fact that the principal underwriters of the IPO cut their 
Facebook’s revenue and growth estimates few days before the listing, and that this information 
was disclosed only to select institutional investors, contributed to reduce investors’ confidence 
in investing in Facebook’s stocks. Other elements that increased controversies and problems 
among investors and that contributed to the failure of the IPO were related to the dual-class 
stock structure used by Facebook which permitted the CEO Zuckerberg to control the majority 
of voting power and which was seen as a way to disenfranchise future non-controlling 
shareholders. Finally, Facebook’s IPO, as reported in its prospectus, had not been planned for 
a specific reason but seemed to be only a good exit strategy for the selling stockholders: when 
retail investors understood that the company was overvalued at the IPO and that pre-IPO 
stockholders benefited from the high offer price to partially liquidate their investments, they 
started to massively sell causing a strong negative stock price performance in the first months 
after the listing.   
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CHAPTER 5 - CONCLUSION  
 
The aim of this thesis was to investigate internet IPOs in order to analyse the level of their initial 
returns and find out which are the most important characteristics of internet firms influencing 
IPO underpricing.  
The analysis performed shows that internet IPOs are characterized by high levels of 
underpricing: US internet-related IPOs conducted in the period from 2000 to 2013 have an 
average positive initial return of 32.63%. The average levels of initial returns and the volume 
of internet-related IPOs fluctuate considerably in the analysed years: both the initial return and 
the volume of IPOs reach their highest levels during the “Dot-com bubble” period (2000-2001) 
and their lowest levels during the financial crisis of the years 2007-2009. 
It has been observed that the level of underpricing is substantially higher for young internet 
firms and decrease with the increase in firms’ age: firms with less than five years old 
(approximately 32% of total firms in the sample) are characterized by the highest mean level 
of initial return (46.28%). Additionally, it has been noted that most internet companies have a 
market capitalization lower than $1 billion (approximately 77% of total companies in the 
sample) but that the companies with the highest market capitalization are generally 
characterized by the highest levels of underpricing. The analysis also shows the mean ratio of 
shares offered to total shares outstanding is 26.78% and that internet IPOs with the lowest ratio 
of shares offered (in other words, with the highest retention rate) have the highest levels of 
initial returns (it has been observed that there seems to be a negative relation between IPO initial 
return and the ratio of shares offered). Finally, it is reported that more than 88% of total IPOs 
of the sample are marketed by the most prestigious and reputed underwriters.  
Internet firms with a market capitalization higher that $10 billion are characterized by an 
extremely high average initial underpricing (61.29%); nevertheless Facebook, which is the 
biggest company went public in the years 2000-2013 (considering market capitalization at the 
time of the IPO), had an IPO first-day return of only 0.61%. I compared Facebook’s IPO with 
the other largest internet IPOs and with the IPOs of its competitors, and I observed that the 
principal differences between Facebook and the other companies are related to the level of 
market capitalization and to the ratio of shares offered in the IPO. From the analysis of 
Facebook’s IPO case, I concluded that the principal reason behind the failure of the Facebook’s 
IPO was the company’s overvaluation at the offer price, but this was not the only cause: the 
massive insider selling that characterized the offering, the high percentage of shares allocated 
94 
to retail investors, the conflict of interests that underwriters’ analysts faced when valuing the 
IPO, the dual-class stock structure of the company and the fact that investment banks cut firm’s 
growth forecasts few days before the listing, were all factors that contributed to cause the 
negative stock price performance of Facebook’s shares after the offering. 
The limitations of this research are firstly related to the sample used: I analysed almost the 
whole population of internet IPOs conducted in the period from 2000 to 2013 and listed on 
NASDAQ and NYSE, but I did not analyse internet IPOs listed outside US on other stock 
exchanges and IPOs completed in different years (before 2000 or after 2013). The limitations 
are also related to the type of analysis performed: the descriptive analysis summarizes and 
quantitatively describes sample data; it is used to highlight potential relations between the 
variables analysed, but it does not allow us to investigate which variables are significantly 
related to the level of IPO underpricing. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
 
  
Figure 28 – Box Plot of IPO Initial Return for sample IPOs.  
(Source: own illustration based on sample data) 
Figure 29 – Scatter Plot which shows Market Capitalization and Initial Return (for 
all firms in the sample). (Source: own illustration based on sample data) 
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Figure 30 – Scatter Plot which shows Initial Return for IPOs in different years.  
(Source: own illustration based on sample data) 
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   Year Ended December 31,   
   2007     2008     2009      2010      2011   
     (in millions, except per share data)   
Consolidated Statements of Operations Data: 
   
   
  
   
  
   
   
   
   
   
Revenue 
   
$ 153   
  
$ 272   
  
$ 777  
   
$1,974  
   
$3,711  
      
Costs and expenses: 
   
   
  
   
  
   
   
   
   
   
Cost of revenue 
   
  41   
  
  124   
  
  223  
   
  493  
   
  860  
Marketing and sales 
   
  32   
  
  76   
  
  115  
   
  184  
   
  427  
Research and development 
   
  81   
  
  47   
  
  87  
   
  144  
   
  388  
General and administrative 
   
  123   
  
  80   
  
  90  
   
  121  
   
  280  
 
       
  
      
  
      
  
       
  
       
  
Total costs and expenses 
   
  277   
  
  327   
  
  515  
   
  942  
   
  1,955  
 
       
  
      
  
      
  
       
  
       
  
Income (loss) from operations 
   
  (124) 
  
  (55) 
  
  262  
   
  1,032  
   
  1,756  
Other expense, net 
   
  11   
  
  1   
  
  8  
   
  24  
   
  61  
 
       
  
      
  
      
  
       
  
       
  
Income (loss) before provision for income taxes 
   
  (135) 
  
  (56) 
  
  254  
   
  1,008  
   
  1695  
Provision for income taxes 
   
  3   
  
  —   
  
  25  
   
  402  
   
  695  
 
       
  
      
  
      
  
       
  
       
  
Net income (loss) 
   
$ (138) 
  
$ (56) 
  
$ 229  
   
$ 606  
   
$1,000  
 
       
  
      
  
      
  
       
  
       
  
Net income (loss) attributable to Class A and Class B 
common stockholders 
   
$ (138) 
  
$ (56) 
  
$ 122  
   
$ 372  
   
$ 668  
 
       
  
      
  
      
  
       
  
       
  
Earnings (loss) per share attributable to Class A and Class B 
common stockholders: 
   
   
  
   
  
   
   
   
   
   
Basic 
   
$(0.16) 
  
$(0.06) 
  
$0.12  
   
$ 0.34  
   
$ 0.52  
 
   
    
  
  
    
  
  
    
  
   
    
  
   
    
  
Diluted 
   
$(0.16) 
  
$(0.06) 
  
$0.10  
   
$ 0.28  
   
$ 0.46  
 
       
  
      
  
      
  
       
  
       
  
Pro forma earnings per share attributable to Class A and 
Class B common stockholders: 
   
   
  
   
  
   
   
   
   
   
Basic 
   
   
  
   
  
   
   
   
   
$ 0.49  
 
   
   
  
   
  
   
   
   
   
    
  
Diluted 
   
   
  
   
  
   
   
   
   
$ 0.43  
 
   
   
  
   
  
   
   
   
       
  
 
     As of December 31,   
        2007           2008           2009           2010           2011     
     (in millions)   
Consolidated Balance Sheets Data: 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
Cash, cash equivalents, and marketable securities 
   
$   305  
   
$   297  
   
$ 633  
   
$1,785  
   
$3,908  
Working capital 
   
  250  
   
  279  
   
  703  
   
  1,857  
   
  3,705  
Property and equipment, net 
   
  82  
   
  131  
   
  148  
   
  574  
   
  1,475  
Total assets 
   
  448  
   
  505  
   
  1,109  
   
  2,990  
   
  6,331  
Total liabilities 
   
  174  
   
  170  
   
  241  
   
  828  
   
  1,432  
Total stockholders’ equity 
   
  273  
   
  335  
   
  868  
   
  2,162  
   
  4,899  
 
Figure 31 - Consolidated Income Statement from 2007 to 2011. (Source: Facebook’s 2011 Registration Statement) 
Figure 32 - Consolidated Balance Sheet Data (2007-2011). (Source: Facebook’s 2011 Registration Statement) 
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Figure 34 – Quarterly Consolidated Income Statement. (Source: Facebook Investor Relations, Q1 - 2012) 
    December 31,    
    2010    2011    
              
Assets 
  
   
 
   
 
Current assets: 
  
   
 
   
 
Cash and cash equivalents 
  
$1,785   
 
$1,512   
 
Marketable securities 
  
  —   
 
  2,396   
 
Accounts receivable, net of allowances for doubtful accounts of $11 and $17 as of 
December 31, 2010 and 2011, respectively 
  
  373   
 
  547   
 
Prepaid expenses and other current assets 
  
  88   
 
  149   
 
 
       
  
      
  
  
Total current assets 
  
  2,246   
 
  4,604   
 
   
Property and equipment, net 
  
  574   
 
  1,475   
 
Goodwill and intangible assets, net 
  
  96   
 
  162   
 
Other assets 
  
  74   
 
  90   
 
 
       
  
      
  
  
Total assets 
  
$2,990   
 
$6,331   
 
 
       
  
      
  
  
Liabilities and stockholders’ equity 
  
   
 
   
 
Current liabilities: 
  
   
 
   
 
Accounts payable 
  
$ 29   
 
$ 63   
 
Platform partners payable 
  
  75   
 
  171   
 
Accrued expenses and other current liabilities 
  
  137   
 
  296   
 
Deferred revenue and deposits 
  
  42   
 
  90   
 
Current portion of capital lease obligations 
  
  106   
 
  279   
 
 
       
  
      
  
  
Total current liabilities 
  
  389   
 
  899   
 
   
Capital lease obligations, less current portion 
  
  117   
 
  398   
 
Long-term debt 
  
  250   
 
  —   
 
Other liabilities 
  
  72   
 
  135   
 
 
       
  
      
  
  
Total liabilities 
  
  828   
 
  1,432   
 
 
       
  
      
  
  
Commitments and contingencies 
  
   
 
   
 
   
Stockholders’ equity: 
  
   
 
   
 
Convertible preferred stock 
  
  615   
 
  615   
 
Common stock 
  
  —   
 
  —   
 
Additional paid-in capital 
  
  947   
 
  2,684   
 
Accumulated other comprehensive loss 
  
  (6) 
 
  (6) 
 
Retained earnings 
  
  606   
 
  1,606   
 
 
       
  
      
  
  
Total stockholders’ equity 
  
  2,162   
 
  4,899   
 
 
       
  
      
  
  
Total liabilities and stockholders’ equity 
  
$2,990   
 
$6,331   
 
 Figure 33 - Consolidated Balance Sheet. (Source: Facebook’s 2011 Registration Statement) 
99 
APPENDIX C 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1,10 $11,97 $17,74 $23,52 $29,30 $35,07
1,20 $14,39 $20,17 $25,95 $31,72 $37,50
1,30 $16,39 $22,16 $27,94 $33,71 $39,49
1,40 $18,05 $23,83 $29,61 $35,38 $41,16
1,50 $19,47 $25,25 $31,02 $36,80 $42,57
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
Sales to Capital Ratio EBIT Margin (Terminal Year)
0-5 years 6-10 years 20% 25% 30% 35% 40%
0,75
0,85
0,95
1,05
1,15
2011 2017
11,42% 6,57% 6,57% $31,80 $34,88 $38,64 $43,32 $49,31
8,37% 9,97% 9,97% $19,42 $20,55 $21,81 $23,25 $24,89
9,90% 8,27% 9,90% 8,27% $24,16 $25,91 $27,94 $30,32 $33,15
Advertising Sector
Internet Sector
Facebook
11,42%
8,37%
*Cost Of Capital
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS (Cost of Capital By Sector)
Cost of Capital Final Growth Rate 
0-5 years 6-10 years 1% 1.5% 2% 2.5% 3%
7,27% $30,77 $33,38 $36,49 $40,24 $44,88
7,77% $27,19 $29,31 $31,81 $34,77 $38,36
8,27% $24,16 $25,91 $27,94 $30,32 $33,15
8,77% $21,55 $23,01 $24,68 $26,62 $28,89
9,27% $19,30 $20,53 $21,92 $23,52 $25,37
0-5 years 6-10 years 3%
9,90%
10,40%
10,90%
Cost of Capital
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
Final Growth Rate 
8,90%
9,40%
1% 1.5% 2% 2.5%
Table 22 - DCF Sensitivity Analysis, changing Final Growth Rate and Cost of Capital.  
(Source: own illustration based on sample data) 
 
Table 23 - DCF Sensitivity Analysis using the Average Cost of Capital of Advertising and Internet Sector.  
(Source: own illustration based on sample data) 
 
Table 24 - DCF Sensitivity Analysis, changing EBIT Margin and Sales to Capital Ratio.  
(Source: own illustration based on sample data) 
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